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QUIRKY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MATTER: THE
TONNAGE CLAUSE, POLAR TANKERS, AND STATE
TAXATION OF COMMERCE
Erik M. Jensen

INTRODUCTION
Found in Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution—a section that
contains explicit limitations on state power—the Tonnage Clause provides
simply that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty
of Tonnage.”1 Even if taxation or constitutional law is your specialty, you
have probably not pondered duties of tonnage. Maybe you heard the term in
high school civics while going through the Constitution, but even if so, you
quickly moved on to sexier topics.2
Whatever you might have thought (or not thought) then, however, this
Article intends to show that the quirky Tonnage Clause is a worthwhile
subject of study. If nothing else, the phrase “duty of tonnage” requires
unpacking, and this Article will do that. Obviously we must focus on the
meaning of “duty” and “tonnage,” and maybe we should consider the “of”
as well.3 And, regardless of what those words mean one-by-one, a
purposive interpretation might be necessary to resolve disputes about the
Tonnage Clause’s scope. 4
The general purpose underlying the Clause is no secret: to prevent a
state, without congressional approval, from taxing vessels solely “for the
privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port.”5 If such duties could be
levied, friction among the states might increase, and national unity might be
strained. So understood, the Tonnage Clause is a limitation on state power
over foreign and interstate commerce. The Clause and the related Import

David L. Brennan Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The
author is grateful to Will Baude for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
2 Remember Letters of Marque and Reprisal? See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Me neither.
3 Commentators sometimes get the language wrong, using “on” rather than “of,” see, e.g.,
FRANCIS H ILLIARD, THE LAW OF TAXATION 64 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1875), as if the preposition makes no difference. But a duty of tonnage need not be imposed on tonnage. See infra notes 110-23
and accompanying text.
4 The Clause presents a nice test of the extent to which constitutional language divorced from
underlying purpose should ever control in interpretation. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause
Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 796 (2010) (noting that “the [Polar Tankers] Court relied upon its
precedents, as against text-based arguments, in construing the tonnage . . . clause[]”).
5 Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1935).
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Export Clause,6 also found in Article I, Section 10, serve as backstops to the
“negative implications” of the Commerce Clause—the idea that the
affirmative grant to Congress of the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes” 7
limits the states’ power to regulate commerce. 8 That kind of issue might not
enthrall the typical tax lawyer, but it quickens the pulses of many
constitutional scholars.
The Tonnage Clause has been understudied in recent years. One
reason that law reviews are not filled with articles on the Clause is that it
had largely disappeared from judicial dockets. It was once a staple of litigation, with a multitude of Supreme Court decisions in the mid- to latenineteenth century. 9 However, although a few state courts have considered
the Clause in the not-too-distant past,10 until 2009 the U.S. Supreme Court
had not heard a Tonnage Clause case since 1935.11 With few judicial
opinions to parse, there was no reason for case-centric legal academics to
study the Clause.12
6

U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports . . . .”); see infra Part III.B.1.
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 306 (1851) (permitting state regulation
of commerce so “local in character” as to require diverse treatment); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (taking the Madisonian position in favor of exclusive federal control over
commerce—as distinguished from exercises of police power within the power of states).
9 See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 18-19; see also S.S. Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31,
32 (1867) (“[T]hat no State without the consent of Congress can lay any duties or imposts on imports or
exports . . . or any duty of tonnage, are familiar provisions of the Constitution, which have been
frequently and thoroughly examined in former judgments of this court.”).
10 See, e.g., City of Valdez v. Polar Tankers, Inc., 182 P.3d 614, 616 (Alaska 2008) (upholding a
city tax on oil tankers), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009), reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31 (2009); Japan Line,
Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 571 P.2d 254, 258 (Cal. 1977) (holding that properly apportioned ad valorem tax
imposed on containers temporarily docked in California was not a prohibited duty of tonnage), rev’d,
441 U.S. 434 (1979); Bigelow v. Dep’t of Taxes, 652 A.2d 985, 986 (Vt. 1994) (holding that “use” tax
imposed on vessels purchased out of state, but used in Vermont for at least thirty days, was not a
prohibited duty of tonnage).
11 Michael S. Greve, Compact Clause, in T HE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE C ONSTITUTION 178, 17879 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005). That case was Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State
Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 266 (1935) (holding that a charge, though measured by tonnage, was in
substance a user fee and therefore not a duty of tonnage).
12 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. T RIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) (ignoring the
Clause). Of course, if the Clause has kept states from enacting anything that might be a duty of tonnage,
that result is powerful. Cf. Brief for the Petitioner at 12, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct.
2277 (2009) (No. 08-310) (“The Tonnage Clause has fallen into relative obscurity in modern times, in
part because it has been generally successful in effectuating the Framers’ goal of discouraging levies
that have the effect of taxing vessels for the privilege of using a harbor.”). But lack of judicial activity
makes a provision less interesting for legal-academic inquiry. Cf. Gregory S. Fisher, Historical Bar:
“Law in the Last Frontier: Commemorating the District of Alaska’s 50th Anniversary”, ALASKA B AR
RAG, Jan.-Mar. 2010, at 19, 22 (referring to the Tonnage Clause as “a relatively obscure provision in the
Constitution”).
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That has changed. In June 2009, the Supreme Court decided Polar
Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez,13 reversing an Alaska Supreme Court
decision that had upheld a levy imposed by Valdez—in the form of a
property tax—that fell primarily on oil tankers using its ports. One of the
challenges made by the taxpayer, a tanker company, was that Valdez’s levy
violated the Tonnage Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. 14
We modern sophisticates are inclined to view provisions like the
Tonnage Clause as historical artifacts. But the Founders thought the Clause
had bite, and, at a minimum, we should try to understand the provision’s
place in the constitutional structure. Aided by the decision in Polar
Tankers—with its defensible result15—this Article argues for the continuing
importance, and intellectual interest, of the Tonnage Clause. It would be
hyperbole to suggest that the Tonnage Clause has moved to the forefront of
American constitutional law, but it still has effect. 16
Polar Tankers motivated this Article, but the Article does more,
discussing the Tonnage Clause as a whole, including several issues not
involved in the recent litigation. Part I begins the process by discussing the
ambiguity inherent in this not-at-all-straightforward provision. Part II outlines the basics of Polar Tankers, with its rich facts and sharply divided
Court. Part III, the heart of the Article, discusses a number of issues
relevant to interpreting the Tonnage Clause: the meaning of “tonnage,” the
purposes underlying the Clause, and the meaning of “duty.” That last
subject requires examining the bewildering variety of terms used in the
Constitution to refer to governmental charges; the distinction between “user
fees” and duties; the question of whether discrimination against vessels is
required for a levy to be an invalid duty of tonnage; and much more.
13

129 S. Ct. 2277, reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31 (2009).
Id. at 2281.
15 See infra Part IV. The result was controversial. Compare James C. Cofer, Supreme Court
Strikes Down Personal Property Tax on Vessels Under Tonnage Clause in Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of
Valdez, Alaska, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 153, 164 (2009) (arguing that the decision “brought the Tonnage
Clause into the twenty-first century”), with Angelo J. Suozzi, Note, The Misinterpretation of the
Tonnage Clause in Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 290, 292 (2009) (arguing
that the “Supreme Court misinterpreted previous Tonnage Clause cases”). Controversy was not
surprising given the split on the Supreme Court. See infra Part II.
16 If Polar Tankers by itself does not get your blood flowing, the Second Circuit decided another
Tonnage Clause case only three weeks before the Supreme Court decision. See Bridgeport & Port
Jefferson Steamboat Co. v. Bridgeport Port Auth., 567 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 1075 (2010) (affirming the district court’s judgment that a fee imposed by a port authority on
passengers taking the ferry between Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Port Jefferson, New York, was unconstitutional, violating both the Commerce and Tonnage Clauses). The fee was a duty of tonnage
because it was intended to raise general revenues and was unrelated in amount to the value of services
provided by the port. Id. at 88. The levy was imposed on passengers totally without regard to “tonnage,”
as originally understood, but the result was consistent with longstanding authority. See, e.g., Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (striking down levy on passengers, with four Justices viewing
charge as duty of tonnage); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
14
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Finally, Part IV considers some remaining questions about Polar Tankers:
Could the constitutional problem with the Valdez ordinance have been
cured with artful drafting, and did the application of the Tonnage Clause
serve its purpose in that case?
I.

THE AMBIGUITY INHERENT IN THE TONNAGE CLAUSE

States are forbidden to “lay any Duty of Tonnage” without
congressional consent.17 In a discussion about how states cannot take steps
that interfere with the federal commerce power, Justice Thomas Cooley
wrote in 1876, in the first edition of his great treatise on taxation:
The precise meaning of [“duty of tonnage”] has been the subject of some controversy.
Vessels are taxable as property, and possibly the tax may be measured by the capacity, when
they are taxed only as property and not as vehicles of commerce; but any such distinction
must be somewhat questionable. It has been often held that a tax on vessels at a certain sum
“per ton” was forbidden. And it seems that a tax of a certain sum upon every vessel arriving
in port is to be regarded as a duty of tonnage, though demanded irrespective of the vessel’s
capacity.18

But only four years later, when focusing on constitutional law, Justice
Cooley’s uncertainty seemed to have evaporated. He was then able to
provide a one-paragraph “Tonnage Clause in a Nutshell”:
The States are . . . forbidden, without the consent of Congress, to lay any duty of tonnage. It
is, therefore, not competent to levy dues upon vessels measured by their capacity, nor indeed
any dues at all which are imposed upon the vessels as instruments of commerce, or are levied
for the mere privilege of trading to a port. But owners of vessels may be taxed by the State
for their interests in them as property, by the same standards employed in other cases.
Wharfage dues are not taxes, and they may, therefore, be laid in proportion to tonnage.19

17 U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Congressional consent was secured once early in the life of the
republic. South Carolina sought to impose a duty of tonnage to “erect[] and support[] an hospital [sic] in
the vicinity of Charleston for the reception and relief of sick and disabled seamen,” Act of Dec. 21,
1804, 2 Acts of the Gen. Ass’y of S.C. 553, 554-55 (seeking consent), and Congress responded,
permitting the duty for up to three years. See Act of Mar. 28, 1806, ch. 17, 2 Stat. 357.
18 T HOMAS M. COOLEY, A T REATISE ON THE LAW OF T AXATION 61 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co.
1876) (footnotes omitted) (citing Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577 (1874); State Tonnage
Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204 (1870); S.S. Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867);
Lott v. Mobile Trade Co., 43 Ala. 578 (1869), rev’d sub nom. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 204 (1870)).
19 T HOMAS M. C OOLEY, T HE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 76 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1880) [hereinafter COOLEY, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES] (footnotes omitted). This language remained unchanged through the final edition of the
Cooley treatise, published in 1931, long after his death. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL
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That is about as clear as an explanation can be. 20 Whatever “tonnage” is—
and whatever a “duty of tonnage” is—the Clause does not limit the power
of states to impose either a property tax that reaches vessels or a user fee for
port services provided by a state, like wharfage or pilotage.21
Justice Cooley was closer to the mark the first time around, however,
in expressing skepticism about the possibility of bright-line distinctions in
this area. At an abstract level, it might be the case that “[v]essels are taxable
as property . . . when they are taxed only as property and not as vehicles of
commerce,”22 but, as Cooley had emphasized in 1876, “any such distinction
must be somewhat questionable.”23 American lawyers are schooled in the
idea that substance controls over form—in many contexts at least—and
formalistic distinctions would be suspect here. If the Tonnage Clause
protects anything important, it should not be possible for a state to
circumvent the Clause by calling a duty a property tax or a user fee, or by
otherwise crafting a levy that has the effect of a duty of tonnage. Unless a
state altogether avoids charging vessels that use its ports, difficult
characterization issues are likely to arise under the Tonnage Clause.24
Outside of the state context, levies on “tonnage” have been common in
the United States.25 Nothing in the Constitution precludes such levies by the
federal government, the government responsible for regulating foreign and
interstate commerce. Professor Henry Carter Adams began his widely noted
book, Taxation in the United States 1789-1816, with a section entitled
“Customs Duties and Tonnage Acts”—a discussion of federal protectionist
taxation, including taxes on tonnage. 26 Adams described the United States’
first tonnage act in 1789, which imposed a levy of six cents per ton on
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 113-14 (Andrew A. Bruce
ed., 4th ed. 1931).
20 In the second edition of his tax treatise, Cooley also seemed sure about the Clause’s meaning.
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 91-94 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co.,
2d ed. 1886) (1876).
21 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 314 (1851) (noting that tonnage duties
were “known to the commerce of a civilized world to be as distinct from fees and charges for
pilotage . . . as they were from charges for wharfage or towage, or any other local port-charges for
services rendered to vessels or cargoes”).
22 COOLEY, supra note 18, at 61-62. The word “might” is used here to suggest that the conventional wisdom on this point may be incorrect. And not all of the Justices in Polar Tankers thought that a
nondiscriminatory property tax could have been imposed on tankers using Valdez’s ports. See Polar
Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2287-88 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment), reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31 (2009); see also infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
23 COOLEY, supra note 18, at 62.
24 Many states have dispensed with levies on vessels that could even conceivably be characterized
as tonnage duties. See supra note 12. But maybe we need to begin thinking about levies on aircraft. See
infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
25 See 2 HENRY CARTER ADAMS, T AXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1789-1816, at 5-7 (Herbert
B. Adams ed., Baltimore, John Murphy & Co. 1884).
26 Id.
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American-built and American-owned ships; thirty cents per ton on foreignbuilt or foreign-owned ships; and fifty cents per ton on both foreign-built
and foreign-owned ships. 27
The federal government has imposed tonnage duties ever since;28 the
U.S. Code today contains tonnage taxes denominated as such.29 To be valid,
a federal duty of tonnage must satisfy only the constitutional rules that
apply to the national taxing power, an easy set of requirements for this sort
of levy.30 As a result, the definitional problems that arise for states—that is,
is a charge a duty of tonnage or not?—are not implicated with federal levies
on ships’ use of ports.
II.

POLAR TANKERS: THE BASICS

The Trans-Alaska Pipeline is used to transport oil from the North
Slope of Alaska to the port city of Valdez, Alaska, where tankers can send
the oil to refineries.31 In 1999, Valdez adopted an ordinance, effective in
2000, that for the first time imposed a levy denominated as a personal
property tax, but which, by its terms, applied to only one category of
property: “[b]oats and vessels of at least 95 feet in length” that used private

27 Id. at 40 (describing Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27). The first tonnage duties were in
addition to tariffs on imported goods. See DALL W. FORSYTHE, TAXATION AND POLITICAL C HANGE IN
THE YOUNG NATION 1781-1833, at 65 (1977). Given the constitutional structure, there was no reason to
question federal power to do this. The congressional debate on the first tonnage duty was not about the
propriety of the enactment or the propriety of having different rates for U.S. and foreign vessels. Rather,
it was about whether the duties should vary depending on the friendliness of the ship’s home country
toward the United States. See id. at 64-65.
28 Cf. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 216 (1870) (“Tonnage duties . . . have
been imposed by Congress ever since the Federal government was organized under the Constitution to
the present time.”).
29 See 46 U.S.C. §§ 60301-12 (2008).
30 Such a levy will be valid if authorized under the broad authority of the Taxing Clause, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises”), which should not be a problem, and if it meets the requirements of the Uniformity Clause.
See U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (providing that “Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States”). Uniformity should be satisfied so long as the levy is applied in the same way in
all ports across the United States. See ERIK M. JENSEN, THE TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 77-78 (2005) [hereinafter JENSEN, T AXING POWER]. A tonnage
duty levied on foreign vessels was long ago held not to be a tax on articles exported and therefore not in
violation of the Export Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty
shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”); Aguirre v. Maxwell, 1 F. Cas. 212, 213
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853). See generally JENSEN, TAXING POWER, supra, at 135-64; Erik M. Jensen,
The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 6-15 (2003) [hereinafter Jensen, Export Clause] (providing
background on the Export Clause and its origins).
31 See Pipeline Facts, ALYESKA PIPELINE SERV. C O., http://www.alyeska-pipe.com/
pipelinefacts.html (last updated May 28, 2010).
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docks in Valdez32 and that established a tax situs there. 33 Although oil tankers were not mentioned in the ordinance, the definition made the tax applicable primarily to them. 34 In its first year in effect, the ordinance applied to
twenty-eight vessels—twenty-four tankers, three tugboats, and one
passenger cruise ship.35 For vessels that also had tax situses elsewhere
during the year, the tax was apportioned to take into account the time the
vessels were in ports other than Valdez’s.36
According to the Alaska Supreme Court, Valdez established the levy
to reinvigorate its revenue system. 37 As is typically true with taxes, the goal
was to raise revenue for general governmental purposes. There was no
direct link between the charge paid by a tanker owner and any
governmental benefit received by that owner, and Valdez did not claim
otherwise. 38 The city’s tax base had been dependent on oil- and gas-related
property, and, as North Slope operations declined, the value of that property
had decreased as well. 39

32

The full text of the ordinance is as follows:
Boats and vessels of at least 95 feet in length for which certificates of documentation have
been issued under the laws of the United States are subject to taxation at their full and true
value unless the vessel is used primarily in some aspect of commercial fishing or docks exclusively at the Valdez Container Terminal where it is subject to municipal dockage charges.
City of Valdez v. Polar Tankers, Inc., 182 P.3d 614, 616 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Valdez Ordinance
No. 99-17 (1999) (codified as amended at VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.020(A)(1) (2008))) (internal
quotation marks omitted), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2277, reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31 (2009). Because vessels
docking at the Valdez Container Terminal or other city-owned docks would have been subject to
municipal dockage charges, one purpose of the ordinance was to prevent shippers from avoiding such
charges by using a private dock. See id. The past tense is used here to describe the ordinance because, as
a result of Polar Tankers, it is no longer in place.
33 In general, the situs requirement applied to vessels that regularly traveled to Valdez, were kept
or used there, or annually took on at least $1 million in cargo or engaged in other business of
comparable value in Valdez. See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2281 (citing
Valdez Ordinance No. 99-17 (1999) (codified as amended at VALDEZ MUN. C ODE § 3.12.020(C)
(2008))), reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31 (2009).
34 The tankers satisfied the length requirement and met at least one threshold to establish tax situs
in Valdez. Any tanker was likely to take on cargo of at least $1 million annually. See supra text
accompanying note 33.
35 Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2283.
36 City of Valdez, 182 P.3d at 616 (citing Valdez Ordinance No. 99-17 (1999) (codified as
amended at VALDEZ MUN. C ODE § 3.12.020(B) (2008))) (giving authority to city assessor to develop
apportionment formula for vessels with tax situses outside Valdez); see also id. (discussing the
apportionment requirement for the tax based on a formula that multiplied assessed value by “a ratio
determined by the number of days spent in Valdez divided by the total number of days spent in all ports,
including Valdez, where the vessel has acquired a situs for taxation” (quoting Valdez, Alaska,
Resolution No. 00-15 (May 1, 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
37 Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2284.
38 The charge, therefore, could not possibly have been characterized as a permissible user fee. See
discussion infra Part III.C.2.
39 See City of Valdez, 182 P.3d at 616.
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Polar Tankers, a subsidiary of oil giant ConocoPhillips, challenged the
application of the levy to its vessels, each of which typically spent forty to
fifty days per year in Valdez. 40 It argued that “the tax effectively imposed a
fee on certain vessels for the privilege of entering the port”41 and was
therefore a duty of tonnage, and, in the alternative, that the apportionment
scheme overstated the percentage of time that tankers were in Valdez, and
hence the tax liability of those tankers, in violation of the Commerce and
Due Process Clauses.42
The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the ordinance against both
challenges. 43 On the Tonnage Clause issue, the court concluded that
jurisprudence under the Clause had always recognized the permissibility of
a property tax, that the Valdez levy was such a tax in form and operation,
and that “the legitimacy of the vessel tax does not depend on whether the
city chooses to tax other personal property.”44 Valdez’s singling out of
vessels in a personal property tax should be irrelevant for Tonnage Clause
analysis.
Polar Tankers then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court. Given the way
the Court dealt with the Tonnage Clause issue—holding the ordinance
unconstitutional under that Clause45—the apportionment issue did not have
to be addressed. That was unfortunate. Polar Tankers had raised significant
issues about Valdez’s apportionment scheme, and the Court could have
provided useful guidance for the future.46 But the Court’s focus on the
40

Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2281, 2292.
Id. at 2281.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 City of Valdez, 182 P.3d at 623.
45 Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2281.
46 The apportionment formula did not take into account the time a tanker was at sea or was being
repaired. For example, if a tanker was in a Valdez port for sixty days during the year and was in other
ports for 120 days, Valdez would have treated the tanker as in Valdez for one-third of the year, not onesixth. See supra note 36. The resulting tax liability would have been double what Polar Tankers thought
the Due Process Clause permitted. Ancient authority had limited property taxation to that of the home
port of the vessel. See, e.g., Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 283 (1878) (“[T]axes levied by a
State upon ships or vessels owned by the citizens of the State as property, based on a valuation of the
same as property, are not within the prohibition . . . .”); St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423,
432 (1870) (concluding that St. Louis could not tax boats when their home port was elsewhere).
However, the home port doctrine had been discarded long ago. Unless the Tonnage Clause applies, a
state is now permitted to impose its property tax on vessels based in other states or nations if the vessels
have established tax situses in the taxing state, but only insofar as the tax liability is determined using a
reasonable apportionment formula.
Apportionment interested many amici, particularly business groups concerned about expanded
state taxing power. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae of National Federation of Independent Business
Small Business Legal Center in Support of Petitioner at 3, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129
S. Ct. 2277 (2009) (No. 08-310); Brief of Broadband Tax Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 3-4, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009) (No. 08-310). Several
states filed a brief supporting Valdez with little discussion of the Tonnage Clause. See Brief of the States
41
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Tonnage Clause had the beneficial effect, for the purposes of this Article, of
making the Clause relevant again.
For the Alaska Supreme Court, it had not mattered whether the Valdez
tax singled out vessels, but discrimination was an issue for several U.S.
Supreme Court Justices.47 One question, not considered below, was whether
it was appropriate to look at the Valdez levy on large ships in isolation, or
whether the Valdez taxing structure as a whole (coupled with the larger
Alaska taxation scheme) should have been considered.48 Another Valdez
property tax ordinance reached trailers, mobile homes, and recreational
vehicles, 49 property that might have been treated as personal (although the
four-Justice plurality saw these items effectively as real property). 50 And
still another ordinance imposed a tax on property used “primarily in the
exploration for, production of, or pipeline transportation of gas or unrefined
oil.”51 If these other provisions had been considered, Valdez argued, the
ordinance reaching oil tankers would have looked like part of a larger,
personal property tax regime not directed at oil tankers.52 And if that had
been so, the ordinance would have looked less like a duty of tonnage.
The record on the structure of Valdez’s and Alaska’s tax regimes was
not well developed. The Supreme Court was obviously confused by the
details,53 and the Court would have benefitted from further consideration by
of Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 4, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009) (No. 08-310).
The Clause attracted attention from shipping interests supporting Polar Tankers. See, e.g., Brief of
Amici Curiae World Shipping Council & Cruise Lines International Association in Support of Petitioner
at 4-5, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009) (No. 08-310); Brief of Tropical
Shipping and Construction Company Limited as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6-7, Polar
Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009) (No. 08-310).
47 See Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2284-87 (discussing the discriminatory nature of the tax).
48 Id. at 2286.
49 Id. at 2285 (citing VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.022 (2008)).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2293 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 43.56.210(5)(A) (2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Another question was whether this last levy was a municipal ordinance at all
and whether the answer to that question mattered. The language of the ordinance reached property
taxable under Alaska Statutes Chapter 43.56—the ordinance referenced the state statute—but that
provision specifically authorizes a “municipality [to] levy” such taxes. Id. at 2293 (quoting
§ 43.56.010(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this circular structure, was the tax a creature
of the municipality or the state? The plurality in effect treated the city and state as distinct bodies for
these purposes. See id. at 2286 (plurality opinion). Although this issue was not critical to their analysis,
the two dissenters disagreed, on the reasonable ground that cities are state creations. See id. at 2293-94
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
52 See Brief for Respondent at 3-4, 23-25, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277
(2009) (No. 08-310) (arguing that the personal property taxes reached more than oil tankers and that the
1999 Valdez ordinance in effect extended existing levies to tankers).
53 See Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2286 (acknowledging that the Court “lack[s] the State’s
explanation of just how the tax on oil-related vehicles works”).
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judges with expertise in Alaska law. But it was unwilling to send the case
back to the Alaska courts.54 Instead, the plurality blithely concluded that
“[a]s far as we can tell, . . . Valdez applies a value-based personal property
tax to ships and to no other property at all.”55 With this informed guess in
place, the Valdez ordinance was at risk under the Tonnage Clause.
Polar Tankers presented a stark set of issues, and the case divided the
Supreme Court. Seven Justices agreed that the levy was a forbidden duty of
tonnage, but they were split three ways on the rationale for that result. 56
Justice Stephen Breyer’s plurality opinion—joined by Justices Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg—concluded that the
levy, when analyzed alone, was a duty of tonnage rather than a permissible
property tax because it did not reach vessels “in the same manner” as it did
other personal property.57 Discrimination against vessels was key to
characterizing the levy as a duty of tonnage: “We can find little, if any,
other personal property that it taxes.”58 Moreover, Justice Breyer wrote,
“the City fail[ed] to point to a single oil tanker, or any vessel greater than
95 feet in length, that both entered the port and failed to establish a tax
situs.”59 In the form of a property tax, the Valdez levy thus “operate[d] as a
‘charge for the privilege of entering . . . a port,’” the quintessential duty of
tonnage. 60
Justice Samuel Alito concurred, joining all of Justice Breyer’s opinion
for the plurality except for the part discussing discrimination.61 Justice Alito
concluded that once the levy had been characterized as on vessels, the
plurality had no reason to imply that a nondiscriminatory tax might have
been acceptable: “It is sufficient for present purposes that the Valdez tax is
not [a nondiscriminatory] tax and therefore, even if the Tonnage Clause
permits a true, evenhanded property tax to be applied to vessels, the Valdez
tax is an unconstitutional duty of tonnage.”62
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas agreed that
the levy was an impermissible duty of tonnage, but they thought the scope
of the Tonnage Clause was broader than the understanding reflected in the
opinions of the other Justices, in the Supreme Court decisions on the books,
54

Apparently not enthralled by Tonnage Clause issues, hard as that is to believe, the Court chose
to quickly dispose of this dispute. See id. at 2287.
55 Id. (emphasis added).
56 See id. at 2284-85; id. at 2287-89 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 2289 (Alito, J., concurring).
57 Id. at 2285 (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S.
273, 284 (1878)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58 Id.
59 Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2284.
60 Id. (quoting Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 26566 (1935)).
61 Id. at 2289 (Alito, J., concurring).
62 Id.
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and in historic treatises.63 As far as Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas were concerned, a state may not apply its personal property tax to
vessels from other states, period.64 Even if the Valdez and Alaska statutes—
when read together—had not discriminated against tankers, the ordinance
was invalid as applied to vessels. Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “The
majority[—including the plurality, plus Justice Alito—]correctly concludes
that the Valdez tax is a tonnage duty, and that should be the end of the
matter.”65 If the Tonnage Clause requires exempting vessels from a nondiscriminatory tax, thus treating vessels better than other property, that result
would “reflect[] the high value the Framers placed on the free flow of maritime commerce.”66
Finally, two dissenters, Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter, 67
concluded that under traditional jurisprudence, the levy was a permissible
property tax that applied only to property with a tax situs in Valdez. 68
Quoting a nineteenth-century case, Transportation Co. v. Wheeling,69 the
dissenters said it was “too well settled to admit of question that taxes levied
by a State, upon ships or vessels . . ., as property, based on a valuation of
the same as property, to the extent of such ownership, are not within the
prohibition of the Constitution.”70 Looking at the larger tax structure,
Justices Stevens and Souter questioned whether this levy did in fact
discriminate against vessels.71 But they would have voted to uphold the levy
anyway.72 A duty of tonnage is not measured by value, they said—if the tax
is tied to value, it is being applied “in the same manner” as other,
permissible property taxes73—and that proposition should have decided the
case, at least on the Tonnage Clause issue. 74
63

Id. at 2287-89 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2288 (“We have never held that the Tonnage Clause allows such property taxes to be
imposed on visiting ships.”).
65 Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2288 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citation omitted).
66 Id.
67 Should another Tonnage Clause case reach the Court in the near future—unlikely, but
possible—it is worth noting that both Justice Stevens and Justice Souter have retired.
68 Polar Tankers’s vessels had established a situs by meeting at least one of the alternative
jurisdictional requirements of the Valdez ordinance. See supra text accompanying note 33.
69 99 U.S. 273 (1878).
70 Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2290 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Transp. Co., 99 U.S. at 279)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The full quotation refers to ships “owned by the citizens of the
State,” reflecting the understanding that a state could tax only those vessels with a home port in the
state. Id. (quoting Transp. Co., 99 U.S. at 279) (internal quotation marks omitted). That doctrine is no
longer relevant. See supra note 46.
71 Id. at 2292-94.
72 Id. at 2292.
73 See id. at 2291 (quoting Transp. Co., 99 U.S. at 284) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74 If the dissenters had prevailed on the Tonnage Clause, it would then have been necessary for the
Court to address the apportionment question.
64

680

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 18:3

A recapitulation: seven Justices thought the levy was an invalid duty
of tonnage. Of those, four thought the levy invalid only because of
discrimination against vessels; one found it unnecessary to consider
whether a nondiscriminatory duty might have been valid because this levy
was so clearly discriminatory; and the other two considered discrimination
irrelevant in applying the Tonnage Clause. Only the two dissenters thought
a property tax, measured by value, was valid as applied to vessels in these
circumstances. These are smart people, and the division on the Court,
having little or nothing to do with ideology, shows that none of this is easy.
III. DUTIES OF TONNAGE: INTERPRETATIVE ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
A duty of tonnage is a levy associated with a ship’s “entering, trading
in, or lying in a port”75 and is apparently tied, at least tangentially, to the
concept of “tonnage.” That definition is quite abstract, however, and, as the
discussion in Part I suggested, it is easier to say what a duty of tonnage is
not than what it is. A tonnage duty must be distinguished from a user fee—
that is, a charge for services provided to a ship by the government
responsible for the port76—and maybe from a property tax that applies to
vessels in the same way it does to other property.77
Some cases that reached the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century
provide examples of what now seem to be noncontroversial duties of
tonnage—so obvious that no state or state subdivision could enact a similar
levy today.78 For example, in Cannon v. New Orleans,79 decided in 1874, a
New Orleans ordinance provided in part that “the levee dues on all steam
boats which shall moor or land in any part of the port of New Orleans shall
be fixed as follows[:] ten cents per ton if in port not exceeding five days.”80
The Court concluded:
Whatever more general or more limited view may be entertained of the true meaning of
th[e Tonnage C]lause, it is perfectly clear that a duty or tax or burden imposed under the
authority of the State, which is, by the law imposing it, to be measured by the capacity of the
vessel [i.e., the charge “per ton”], and is in its essence a contribution claimed for the privilege of arriving and departing from a port of the United States, is within the prohibition.81

75

Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1935).
See infra Part III.C.2.
77 But see supra note 22; infra Part III.C.3.
78 Valdez’s ordinance, however, was also so problematic that it should not have been enacted as it
was.
79 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577 (1874).
80 Id. at 578 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 Id. at 581.
76
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The charge was not a user fee because it applied, in theory at least, regardless of where a vessel moored (and regardless, therefore, of whether services were provided). 82 And, not based on value, it was not a property tax.83
Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker,84 decided in 1876, was another easy
case for Tonnage Clause analysis. There, the Court held that charges
imposed by the captain of the port of New York, explicitly tied to tonnage,
were invalid.85 The charge could not have been a user fee because it was
imposed regardless of services provided: “If the vessel enter the port and
immediately take her departure, or load or unload, or make fast to any
wharf, either of these things disjunctively brings her within the act, and
makes her liable to the burden prescribed.”86 Nor was the charge a property
tax because it was not measured by value. 87
All cases are not so easy, however, and this Part now considers several
key interpretive issues under the Tonnage Clause. It begins with a
discussion of the meaning of “tonnage” and questions whether that concept
still has relevance to Tonnage Clause analysis. It then turns to the purposes
underlying the Clause, as discerned from Founding-era debates and
subsequent case law and commentary: to protect the Import-Export Clause
and, more generally, federal power over commerce. The final Section
examines the meaning of “duty” in the Tonnage Clause, dealing with three
questions: whether the term distinguishes prohibited levies from other taxlike charges on vessels; whether “duty” includes legitimate user fees; and
whether the Tonnage Clause, by its terms, constitutes an absolute
prohibition against state duties of tonnage, absent congressional consent. 88
A.

“Tonnage”

The term “tonnage”—or, more expansively, “tonnage and
poundage”—has a long history. As exemplified by England’s Tonnage and
Poundage Act of 1660,89 tonnage and poundage were “duties on goods

82

Id. at 580-81; see infra Part III.C.2.a.
Cannon, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 581; see infra Part III.C.3. But see infra notes 99-102 and
accompanying text (noting the possibility that “tonnage” was understood as a surrogate for value).
84 94 U.S. 238 (1876).
85 Id. at 244 (“The State, in passing this law imposing a tonnage duty, has exercised a power
expressly prohibited to it by the Constitution. In that particular the law is, therefore, void.”).
86 Id. at 243.
87 Id.
88 On that point, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas got it right in Polar Tankers, although
their position was contrary to 150 years of jurisprudence. Why let a little history interfere with original
understanding?
89 12 Car. 2, c. 4 (Eng), cited in 2 E DWARD CHANNING, A H ISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: A
CENTURY OF COLONIAL H ISTORY 1660-1760, at 11 (1908). The Act, however, has antecedents dating to
83
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imported into or exported out of England and the dominions thereunto
belonging.”90 The term “tonnage” apparently derives from levies imposed
on tuns of wine. 91 Such port duties on goods were commonly imposed by
the American colonies as well. 92
But that is not what the term “tonnage” means in the Tonnage Clause.
Duties on ships in the American colonies (as contrasted with duties on
goods carried by ships) can be traced as far back as 1645.93 In this context,
the term “tonnage,” when used as the measure of a duty imposed on a ship,
technically refers to cargo capacity, rather than weight.94 The larger the
ship’s capacity, the larger the duty. For these purposes, a “ton” was
generally considered to be one hundred cubic feet. 95
Thus, the term “tonnage” as used in the Tonnage Clause has a meaning
different from “tonnage and poundage.” If this were not the case, the
Import-Export Clause, forbidding states to tax imports and exports without
congressional approval, and the Tonnage Clause, directed at levies on ships
carrying the goods, would be largely redundant. Nevertheless, the term’s
historical ties to duties on imports and exports should help us understand
the relationship of the clauses.96

the fourteenth century. See ALVIN RABUSHKA, TAXATION IN C OLONIAL AMERICA 28 (2008) (tracing
“tonnage on wine and poundage on goods” to 1347).
90 CHANNING, supra note 89. Channing noted that the 1660 Act was not enforced in the American
colonies. Id. However, the fact that the duties were on the books was later used in support of the
proposition that the Crown had authority to tax the colonies. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO TAX 163 (1987).
91 RABUSHKA, supra note 89.
92 See id. (describing tonnage and poundage as port duties).
93 The early duties were known as “[p]owder duties” because cash was not a common medium of
exchange, and gunpowder and iron shot were used for payment. Id. at 174. The colonial rules had all
sorts of quirks, but each colony apparently exempted its own ships from tonnage duties. Id. at 174-75.
94 Id. at 175.
95 See W. H. BURROUGHS, A T REATISE ON THE LAW OF T AXATION § 63, at 89 (New York, Baker,
Voorhis & Co. 1877) (“[T]onnage . . . means the contents of the vessel expressed in tons of one hundred
cubical feet each.”); JAMES M. GRAY, LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER 479 (1906) (“[T]he word
tonnage, as applied to American ships and vessels, means their entire cubical capacity, or the contents of
the vessel expressed in tons of 100 cubic feet, as estimated and ascertained by the rules of admeasurement and computation prescribed by those Federal statutes.” (quoting State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 204, 212 (1870))). That understanding followed English practice:
The tons used by the English to register merchant ships prior to 1773 correspond most
closely to what Frederic C. Lane has called ‘measurement freight tonnage’, ‘freight tons’, or
‘tons burden’, all of which were terms that represented the cubic volume of space available
in a ship for carrying cargo.
JAMES F. SHEPHERD & GARY M. WALTON, SHIPPING, MARITIME TRADE, AND THE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 237 (1972) (quoting Frederic C. Lane, Tonnages,
Medieval and Modern, 17 ECON. H IST. REV. 213, 214-18 (1964)).
96 This Article shall return to that relationship presently. See infra Part III.B.1.
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That “tonnage” technically means capacity rather than weight is of
little, if any, significance in interpreting the Tonnage Clause.97 One would
expect a correlation between those two attributes—the larger the carrying
capacity, the greater its weight is likely to be—and therefore expect a state
levy measured by a vessel’s weight to be presumptively a duty of tonnage. 98
The correlation between weight and capacity would not be perfect, of
course, but it would be close enough.
For that matter, as recognized, at least implicitly, by the seven nondissenting justices in Polar Tankers, a correlation would exist between
capacity and value of a vessel as well, so that an ad valorem tax applied to
vessels might be treated as a duty of tonnage in some circumstances. 99
Indeed, in his posthumously published Lectures on the Constitution of the
United States, which appeared in 1893, Justice Samuel Freeman Miller,
who had authored several opinions on the Tonnage Clause, went even
further.100 He said “tonnage” means value: “The word ‘tonnage’ was used
by the framers . . . because at that day and time it was the customary mode
of measuring the value of a ship.”101 Miller added:
A vessel was said to be of so many tons burden, which meant that it was worth so much
money, carried so much freight, and, therefore, the method generally adopted of imposing a
tax upon its tonnage was the readiest way to fix the amount which that species of property
should pay.102

Apparently Justice Miller did not give controlling weight to the
Framers’ understanding, however, because in his treatise he conceded “that
if a man living in Louisiana owns a steamboat, it is liable to be taxed like
any other property that he may possess there, and if a tax is levied upon it,
. . . that is not a tonnage tax,”103 even if the amount of the tax is “measured
by [the steamboat’s] capacity.”104 That proposition is consistent with longtime understanding—that is, as long as vessels are “taxed like any other
property,” a property tax does not violate the Tonnage Clause.105 Moreover,
97

State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 225 (“[T]he term, as applied to a ship, has
become almost synonymous with that of size.”).
98 “Presumptively” is used here because a user fee may be measured by capacity or weight. See
infra Part III.C.2.b.
99 See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (“[A] tax on the value of such
vessels is closely correlated with cargo capacity. Because the imposition of the tax depends on a factor
related to tonnage and that tonnage-based tax is not for services provided to the vessel, it is unconstitutional.”), reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. (2009).
100 See SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 25354 (photo reprint 1980) (New York & Albany, Banks & Bros. 1891).
101 Id. at 253.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 254.
104 Id.
105 See supra text accompanying note 19.
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the Supreme Court has never said that an ad valorem property tax on
vessels is by its nature a duty of tonnage. 106 Other late nineteenth-century
treatise writers, working when the Tonnage Clause was often before the
Supreme Court, consistently said that a nondiscriminatory property tax that
reached vessels was permissible and cited authority for that position.107
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas took the contrary position in
Polar Tankers—that is, that even a nondiscriminatory property tax on outof-state vessels was a duty of tonnage (and a fortiori the discriminatory
Valdez levy was invalid). But at least six other Justices, the plurality and
the dissenters, accepted the proposition that a property tax, which reaches
vessels, is not automatically a duty of tonnage. 108
Whatever the technical meaning of “tonnage,” it fell by the wayside in
nineteenth-century Supreme Court jurisprudence for good substance-overform reasons.109 The constitutional phrase is “duty of tonnage,” and a plainmeaning proponent might reasonably argue that a duty, which by its terms
has nothing to do with tonnage, however understood (e.g., as capacity,
weight, value, etc.), ought not to be treated as a “duty of tonnage.” But if
the Tonnage Clause proscribed only levies that were explicitly measured by
a vessel’s capacity or by some related concept, it would be too easy for
states to circumvent the Clause.
A duty of tonnage thus need not be a duty on tonnage. 110 As Justice
Robert Cooper Grier explained in 1849 in the Passenger Cases111—where
constitutionally invalid levies were imposed on alien passengers arriving in
the ports of Massachusetts and New York rather than on vessels carrying
the passengers—if form controlled, it would be possible for a state to “do
that indirectly which she is forbidden by the [Tonnage Clause] to do
directly.”112 A clause that forbids a state from “levy[ing] a duty or tax . . .
graduated on the tonnage or admeasurement of the vessel” must therefore
forbid a state from “effect[ing] the same purpose by merely changing the
ratio, and graduating it on the number of masts, or of mariners, the size and
power of the steam-engine, or the number of passengers which she
106 Indeed, the Alaska Supreme Court in Polar Tankers took the diametric position: “[A] charge
based on the value of property is not a duty of tonnage.” City of Valdez v. Polar Tankers, Inc., 182 P.3d
614, 623 (Alaska 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2277, reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31 (2009); see also supra text
accompanying notes 18-19 (quoting two Thomas Cooley treatises); infra text accompanying note 277
(quoting treatise of W. H. Burroughs).
107 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 18-19 (quoting two Thomas Cooley treatises); infra text
accompanying note 277 (quoting treatise of W. H. Burroughs).
108 Concurring Justice Alito did not think it necessary to make any categorical pronouncement on
that point, given that the Valdez levy was discriminatory. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
109 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 111-13 and 119-22.
110 No court has focused on the prepositions in this way, but doing so makes sense. Prepositions do
not get the respect they are due in constitutional interpretation. See supra note 3.
111 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
112 Id. at 458 (Grier, J.).
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carries.”113 A state cannot avoid the Tonnage Clause by labeling a tax on
capacity as “a charge on the owner or supercargo” or on anything else. 114
There was no opinion of the Court in the Passenger Cases—the five-Justice
majority differed on many issues115—but Justice Grier was on the prevailing
side. The Polar Tankers plurality cited Justice Grier’s views with
approval116 in a part of the opinion joined by concurring Justice Alito. 117
And although concurring Justices Roberts and Thomas did not explicitly
join that part of the plurality opinion, there is no reason to think they would
have disagreed with this point.118
In Steamship Co. v. Portwardens,119 decided in 1867, the Court
concluded that even a fixed charge for a vessel’s use of a port (assuming the
amount was not a fee for services120) was invalid. 121 The Founders did not
intend the phrase “duty on tonnage” to be limited to a levy that sets “a
certain rate on each ton.”122 The Court made clear that “any duty on the ship
[imposed by a state or its subdivision], whether a fixed sum upon its whole
tonnage, or a sum to be ascertained by comparing the amount of tonnage

113

Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 459.
115 Professor David Currie made a valiant effort to determine what rationales each Justice had
relied on, but (as he recognized) doing so was impossible. See DAVID P. C URRIE, THE C ONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME C OURT: T HE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 227-30 (1985). At least one of the
five Justices who voted to overturn the levies, John McLean, did not rely on the Tonnage Clause, and
none of the dissenters referred to that Clause. Justice McLean saw the levies as inconsistent with the
federal government’s exclusive control over commerce, see Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 400
(McLean, J.), as did several others. But two of the five Justices in the majority did not mention the
Commerce Clause explicitly in their opinions. See id. at 452-55 (McKinley, J.); id. at 437-52
(Catron, J.). In Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875), the Court struck down a later
version of the New York ordinance, modified in response to the Passenger Cases, on Commerce Clause
grounds. Id. at 272-73. Ships arriving with foreign passengers were required either to post an expensive
bond or to pay $1.50 per foreign passenger. Id. at 267. The Court characterized the arrangement as the
equivalent of a tax:
[I]f it is apparent that the object of this statute . . . is to compel the owners of vessels to pay a
sum of money for every passenger brought by them from a foreign shore, and landed at the
port of New York, it is as much a tax on passengers if collected from them, or a tax on the
vessel or owners for the exercise of the right of landing their passengers in that city, as was
the statute held void in the Passenger Cases.
Id. at 268. Tax-like the charge may have been, but the Tonnage Clause was not mentioned.
116 Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2282-83, reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31
(2009).
117 Id. at 2289 (Alito, J., concurring).
118 Their disagreement was with the plurality’s reliance on discrimination against vessels. Id. at
2287-88 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
119 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867).
120 See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing user fees).
121 Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 35.
122 See id. at 34.
114
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with the rate of duty,” is an impermissible duty of tonnage. 123 A duty may
thus be prohibited even if the connection between charge and “tonnage” is
tenuous or nonexistent.
These results make sense. The Tonnage Clause would impose no
serious restriction on the taxing power of states if it were interpreted to
apply only to levies explicitly measured by ships’ capacities or by some
reasonable surrogate for capacities. With the Clause interpreted to have real
effect, however, the term “tonnage” seems to have little substantive content.
Maybe we should take “tonnage” out of the Tonnage Clause.
Diminished in importance though it might be, the term nevertheless
remains relevant in at least two respects. First, if a state charge is measured
by tonnage—a charge “per ton,” for example—the likelihood of scrutiny
under the Tonnage Clause is heightened.124 The lesson for state and local
officials is clear: if you intend to impose a levy on vessels using your ports,
be careful with your word choice. 125 Valdez’s ordinance, explicitly directed
at large boats and vessels, was asking for trouble.126
Second, the term “tonnage” emphasizes that the levies that concerned
the Founders were on ships or vessels engaged in maritime commerce, and
this might be an important interpretive datum. Here too, however, time may
have passed the traditional understanding by. Is there reason to think the
Tonnage Clause should apply only to means of transport known in 1789?
Just as it is now assumed that congressional power “[t]o raise and support
Armies” and “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy” encompasses having an air

123 Id. at 35. Chief Justice Chase’s opinion for the Court also concluded that the state levy was
invalid under the Commerce Clause, an analysis that should have been unnecessary if the levy was an
impermissible duty of tonnage. See CURRIE, supra note 115, at 332-34. Indeed, the Commerce Clause
discussion was inconsistent with the general proposition that states do retain taxing power unless
specifically divested of such by the Constitution. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden
and the relationship of the Commerce and Tonnage Clauses).
124 Even then, the result is not foreordained. See infra Part III.C.2.b. Compare Peete v. Morgan,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 581, 581-83 (1873) (holding that quarantine fees collected by the health inspector in
Galveston, imposed at a rate of $5 for the first hundred tons and one and a half cents for each additional
ton, were proscribed duties of tonnage), with Morgan’s S.S. Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 46263 (1886) (concluding that fees, varying by type of vessel and imposed by the Board of Health to inspect and perhaps quarantine vessels carrying contagious diseases, were permitted user fees).
125 Cf. Johnson v. Drummond, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 419, 420, 425-27 (1871) (concluding that
Virginia’s oyster law, which imposed a license tax on officers of vessels that “carry[] oysters taken in
the waters of Virginia,” was a duty of tonnage in part because the charge was “three dollars per ton, for
every ton said vessel may measure” (quoting Act of March 3, 1866, § 7, 1865-66 Va. Acts 75) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
126 See supra notes 32-34. It is possible that drafters of the ordinance, not having the benefit of the
Supreme Court decision and this Article, were unaware of the Tonnage Clause. In Part IV, this Article
considers whether the ordinance could have been cured by a wordsmith aware of the Clause and
concludes that a substantive problem would still remain.
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force, 127 one day, perhaps, a state or local charge on aircraft using an airport
will be challenged as a duty of tonnage. 128
In Polar Tankers itself, the Valdez ordinance, applying the levy to
“boats and vessels” longer than ninety-five feet, a factor clearly tied to
capacity, had a connection to tonnage as traditionally understood.129 In
addition, a majority of the Court agreed that “a tax on the value of such
vessels is closely correlated with cargo capacity. . . . [T]he imposition of the
tax depends on a factor related to tonnage.”130 Although the dissenters
complained that the statement was “contrary to our longstanding
recognition that a ship’s capacity is not a proxy for its value,”131 it is hard to
see why that should matter anymore. If even a fixed charge can be a “duty
of tonnage,” then surely a levy measured by value, “closely correlated with
cargo capacity,” can bring the Tonnage Clause into play.132
B.

The Purposes of the Tonnage Clause

It might seem peculiar to have deferred an extended discussion of the
Tonnage Clause’s rationale to this point in the Article, but this Article
considered the meaning of “tonnage” first because it is impossible to
127

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13. The Fourth Amendment is relevant to electronic surveillance,
even though such surveillance was unknown in the eighteenth century. A similar point can be made in
countering the argument made by many commentators that the direct-tax apportionment rule of the
Constitution, see U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, can limit only forms of
taxation known in 1789. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2417 (1997).
128 See State Tax Trends: A Roundtable Discussion, T AXES—T HE T AX MAGAZINE, Jan. 2010, at
23, 42-43 (suggesting that the Tonnage Clause might preempt Dormant Commerce Clause analysis used
in some cases involving airports); cf. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 302-08 (1944)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (failing to mention the Tonnage Clause, but suggesting that rules limiting state
taxation on other forms of commerce should apply with respect to state property tax levied on airplanes,
and ultimately concluding that the Minnesota tax was justified under the home port doctrine then in
effect).
129 The city did not use the term “tonnage” or apply the tax at a rate of so much “per ton,” but it
might as well have.
130 Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2284, reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31 (2009).
131 Id. at 2291 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 2284 (plurality opinion). The dissenters cited to a passage in the State Tonnage Tax Cases
to the effect that “[t]he experience of every one shows that a small steamer, new and well built, may be
of much greater value than a large one, badly built or in need of extensive repairs.” Id. at 2291 n.2
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 224 (1870))
(internal quotation marks omitted). That point is true, but should we not be looking at probabilities? Size
and value would correlate positively so that, in some cases, it would make sense to view an ad valorem
levy as a duty of tonnage. In any event, one of the State Tonnage Tax Cases involved a levy “on the
steamboats wholly irrespective of the value of the vessels as property, and solely and exclusively on the
basis of their cubical contents as ascertained by the rules of admeasurement,” 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 217,
suggesting that value might stand for tonnage in other cases.
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understand the underpinnings of the Clause without getting a grasp on a
basic term that is not part of everyday discourse. With the definition of
“tonnage” explicated (or perhaps eradicated), this Article now examines
what the Tonnage Clause was intended to do.
1.

Reinforcing the Import-Export Clause and Federal Control of
Commerce

This Subsection argues that the Import-Export Clause of the
Constitution, prohibiting states from taxing imports or exports without
congressional approval, 133 was intended to protect federal primacy over
foreign commerce and that the Tonnage Clause should generally be
understood as providing support to the Import-Export Clause. It will also
argue, however, that the Tonnage Clause can apply to prevent state taxation
in some commercial situations that are outside the scope of the ImportExport Clause.
Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution, which begins with
the reference to “Duty of Tonnage,” goes on to include a hodgepodge of
additional limitations on state power, all of which seem to have little to do
with levies on ships: “No State shall . . . keep Troops, or Ships of War in
time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”134 That is heady stuff, far
more important, one might think, than a duty on vessels.135 And those other
provisions seem to be of no help in interpreting the Tonnage Clause, except
to indicate—on the theory that a clause is known by the company it
keeps—that the Founders considered the possibility that a state might
impose a duty of tonnage important in 1787.136
From a theoretical standpoint, the Tonnage Clause fits more
coherently within the preceding clause in Section 10, the so-called ImportExport Clause:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the
net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for

133

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
135 See, e.g., Greve, supra note 11 (devoting almost all attention to the “Compact Clause” portion
of the passage, with only a passing reference to the Tonnage Clause—noting only the lack of Supreme
Court cases since 1935).
136 Chief Justice Roberts made that point in Polar Tankers: “The free flow of maritime commerce
was so important to the Framers that they grouped the prohibition on tonnage duties with bans on keeping troops or ships of war, entering into compacts with other States or foreign powers, and engaging in
war.” Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2288 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
134
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the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Controul of the Congress.137

Regulating “Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes” is a federal responsibility—specifically
given to Congress138—and control over imports and exports is an important
component of that responsibility, at least with respect to “Commerce with
foreign Nations.”139 Unless Congress gives its approval, states are not to
interfere with federal regulation of foreign commerce through the exercise
of their taxing power.140 Indeed, if Congress gives its approval, it would
reflect a congressional determination that a state regulation was not, as
Justice Joseph Story put it, “injurious to the general interests.”141
In his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Justice
Story wrote about the Import-Export Clause:
If there is wisdom and sound policy in restraining the United States from exercising the
power of taxation unequally in the states, there is, at least, equal wisdom and policy in
restraining the states themselves from the exercise of the same power injuriously to the interests of each other. A petty warfare of regulation is thus prevented, which would rouse
resentments, and create dissensions, to the ruin of the harmony and amity of the states.142

Justice Story conceded that even without the constitutional limitation,
it would not be in a state’s interest to impose duties on imports or exports in
a way that would damage the state’s own commerce. 143 But, as powerful as
market forces can be, the Founders were unwilling to rely only on the laws
of economics to protect against abusive state taxation, particularly when

137

U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
139 Id. In The Federalist No. 44, James Madison discusses the Import-Export Clause and describes
the other prohibitions of clauses two and three as “fall[ing] within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 44, at 280 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. Kesler eds., Signet Classic 2003)
(1961). A prohibition against a state declaring war might be obvious, but a restriction on duties of
tonnage?
140 For that matter, even the federal government is forbidden to impose a tax on exports, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”), a limitation that has attracted attention in recent years. Twice in the 1990s, the Supreme Court struck down
federal levies, as applied in particular circumstances, on the ground that they violated the Export Clause.
See United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 370 (1998); United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S.
843, 863 (1996); see also JENSEN, TAXING POWER, supra note 30, at 135.
141 2 JOSEPH STORY, C OMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1013
(photo reprint 1991) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833); see supra note 17 (noting an instance in
which Congress approved a state duty of tonnage).
142 STORY, supra note 141.
143 Id. § 1019.
138
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one state’s taxing scheme can impose costs on persons in other parts of the
country.144
What “dissensions” did Justice Story fear? The general problem, not
limited to taxation, is that described by Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist No. 7: the “[c]ompetitions of commerce” and the resulting
“contention” and “discontent” that would arise if each state were able to
“pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself.”145 With respect to
taxation, Justice Story pointed to the situation under the Articles of Confederation, where, “in the exercise by the states of their general authority to
lay imposts and duties, . . . the most mischievous restraints, preferences,
and inequalities existed; so, that very serious irritations and feuds were
constantly generated, which threatened the peace of the Union.”146
One particular danger of state taxation of imports was that to the
extent state levies could be passed on to the consumers of the taxed
goods—and the general assumption during the Founding period was that
the economic burden of taxes imposed on articles of consumption was
borne by ultimate purchasers147—port states could penalize consumers in
landlocked states.148 James Madison explained the Import-Export Clause as
seeking to prevent states with “convenient ports” from creating taxes that
would hurt residents of states with
144

Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. Kesler
eds., Signet Classic 2003) (1961); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. Kesler eds., Signet Classic 2003) (1961) (deploring the “interfering and
unneighborly regulations of some States” under the Articles of Confederation and noting, by quoting
from an encyclopedia, “the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and states [in Germany]
exact upon the merchandises passing through their territories,” making Germany’s “fine streams and
navigable rivers . . . almost useless” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
146 STORY, supra note 141, § 1014.
147 That was not always assumed—Hamilton understood that the market could constrain a
merchant’s ability to pass the burden of taxes on to consumers—but it was the general view. See THE
FEDERALIST N O. 35, at 208 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. Kesler eds., Signet
Classic 2003) (1961) (“It is not always possible to raise the price of a commodity in exact proportion to
every additional imposition laid upon it. . . . The maxim that the consumer is the payer is so much
oftener true than the reverse of the proposition . . . .”); Jensen, supra note 127, at 2395-96.
148 The term “landlocked” reflects Founding-era thinking, but it does not give a full sense of the
Tonnage Clause’s scope today. The deliberations in the Founding era focused on ports of the original
colonies—that is, seaports. See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283-86 (1976). The
Import-Export Clause was intended to preserve “harmony among the States” by forbidding “seaboard
States, with their crucial ports of entry, . . . from levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing
goods merely flowing through their ports to other States not situated as favorably geographically.” Id. at
285-86; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 556-57 (1959) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting in part) (making same point). But the Tonnage Clause can limit duties imposed on inland
ports as well. Many nineteenth-century cases involved levies on vessels using ports on navigable rivers.
See, e.g., Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559, 559-60 (1881) (applying the Clause to a port in
Tennessee); Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 273 (1878) (applying the Clause to a port in West
Virginia); Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 80-81 (1877) (applying the Clause to a port in Iowa).
145
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no convenient ports for foreign commerce, [and who, as a result,] were subject to be taxed by
their neighbors, thro whose ports, their commerce was carryed [sic] on. New Jersey, placed
between Phila. & N. York, was likened to a Cask tapped at both ends: and N. Carolina between Virga. & S. Carolina to a patient bleeding at both Arms.149

As Madison wrote in a letter in 1832, the Import-Export Clause
effectively prevents port states from “taxing the consumption of their
neighbours.”150 Ultimately, the Import-Export Clause protects federal
control over commerce, 151 particularly commerce with foreign nations. 152
Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 44: “The restraint on the power of the
States over imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which
prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal
councils.”153
And the Tonnage Clause, by supporting the Import-Export Clause,
helps to confirm federal primacy over commerce, particularly with foreign
nations. Treatise writer W. H. Burroughs made that point in 1877:
This prohibition [in the Tonnage Clause], like the [Import-Export Clause], and like the
provision giving to Congress the power to regulate commerce, was designed to enable the
government to give uniformity to the commerce of the States with foreign countries, and
with each other. But it would have been useless to prohibit the taxing of imported goods, if
the States retained the power of taxing the vessels, as such, which carried the goods.154

The Supreme Court said the same thing in 1935, in Clyde Mallory
Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Commission:155 “If the states had been
left free to tax the privilege of access by vessels to their harbors[,] the
prohibition against duties on imports and exports could have been nullified
by taxing the vessels transporting the merchandise.”156
The discussion at the Constitutional Convention about duties of
tonnage was short, but consistent with the proposition that the Tonnage

149

James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL C ONVENTION OF 1787, at 539, 542 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (1911) [hereinafter
FARRAND].
150 Letter from James Madison to Professor Davis (Feb. 6, 1832), in FARRAND, supra note 149, at
518, 519.
151 See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 439 (1827) (noting that the Founders decided
that “the interest of all would be best promoted by placing that whole subject under the control of
Congress,” and then positing reasons why that decision might have been made, including “an
apprehension that the power might be so exercised as to disturb that equality among the States which
was generally advantageous, or that harmony . . . which it was desirable to preserve”).
152 See id. at 446 (noting that the grant to Congress to regulate commerce should comprehend all
commerce between foreign nations).
153 T HE FEDERALIST N O. 44, supra note 139, at 280 (James Madison).
154 BURROUGHS , supra note 95.
155 296 U.S. 261 (1935).
156 Id. at 265.
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Clause protects federal power over commerce. 157 As reported in Madison’s
notes, on September 15, late in the deliberations, James McHenry and
Daniel Carroll of Maryland “moved that ‘no State shall be restrained from
laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing harbours and erecting
light-houses.’”158 After George Mason of Virginia supported the motion by
noting that “the situation of the Chesapeak . . . peculiarly required expences
of this sort,” Gouverneur Morris made the obvious rejoinder to those, like
Mason, who thought they were advancing state power: nothing in the
language considered by the Convention to that point would have expressly
forbidden a state from levying a duty of tonnage, and “[t]he exception
proposed will imply the Contrary, and will put the States in a worse
condition than [Mason] wishes.”159
But, whatever the language used, such a limitation on state power
might have been implicit in the idea of federal power over commerce.
James Madison, a strong proponent of national power in that regard, stated
that such an inference was possible—and appropriate:
Whether the States are now restrained from laying tonnage duties depends on the extent of
the power “to regulate commerce”. [sic] These terms are vague but seem to exclude this
power of the States . . . . [Madison] was more & more convinced that the regulation of
Commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to be wholly under one authority.160

Roger Sherman of Connecticut responded to Madison, arguing that
there was no danger in providing for concurrent federal-state jurisdiction, as
the supreme national power “can controul interferences of the State
regulations (when) such interferences happen.”161 But John Langdon of
New Hampshire “insisted that the regulation of tonnage was an essential
part of the regulation of trade, and that the States ought to have nothing to
do with it.”162 If Sherman was right, however, that concurrent taxing power
over commerce-related matters might otherwise have been inferred from
constitutional language (a proposition that even the great nationalist

157

See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 FARRAND,
supra note 149, at 622, 624-26.
158 Id. at 625. McHenry’s own notes probably provide a more trustworthy transcript of the motion:
“No State shall be prohibited from laying such duties of tonnage as may be sufficient for improving
their harbors and keeping up lights, but all acts laying such duties shall be subject to the approbation or
repeal of Congress.” James McHenry, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in
2 FARRAND, supra note 149, at 633, 633.
159 Madison, supra note 157, at 625.
160 Id.
161 Id. Ultimate congressional control was provided for in the Maryland resolution. See supra note
158.
162 Madison, supra note 157, at 625.
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Alexander Hamilton reluctantly accepted in The Federalist No. 32163), an
explicit prohibition of state duties was necessary.
The Langdon position prevailed, with a motion to the effect that no
state could lay a duty of tonnage without congressional consent—the
Tonnage Clause, as it came to be.164 That motion passed six to four (with
one state delegation divided). 165 The Constitutional Convention did not
revisit the issue, and the rest is history.
This Article has characterized the Tonnage Clause as a backstop for
the Import-Export Clause, but the two clauses do not mesh perfectly, at
least not as the Import-Export Clause has been interpreted. 166 Unlike the
Tonnage Clause, the Import-Export Clause has been deemed to apply only
to foreign commerce, as the terms “imports” and “exports” indicate. 167
Although the status of the original thirteen states was, in the minds of more
than a few Founders, more like that of independent nations—with the
understanding that Georgia might “export” goods to South Carolina 168—the
terms “imports” and “exports” have come to refer to property coming from,
or going to, foreign nations.169 Relying in part on the work of Professor
163 See T HE FEDERALIST N O. 32, at 193-94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R.
Kesler eds., Signet Classic 2003) (1961). Practicalities might limit the use of particular levies by a
government: “It is, indeed, possible that a tax might be laid on a particular article by a State which might
make it inexpedient that a further tax should be laid on the same article by the Union . . . .” Id. at 168.
But the Constitution generally did not forbid concurrent taxation: “[The Import-Export Clause] implies
an admission that if it were not inserted the States would possess the power it excludes; and it implies a
further admission that as to all other taxes, the authority of the States remains undiminished.” Id. at 167.
164 Madison, supra note 157, at 625-26.
165 Id.
166 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Import-Export Clause to deal solely with foreign trade,
see Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 131 (1868), while the Tonnage Clause applies equally
to foreign and interstate commerce. State Tax Trends, supra note 128, at 42.
167 Hence the use of terms like “seaboard” or “inland” to describe the tensions that the ImportExport Clause was intended to lessen. See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1976)
(standing for the proposition that the Import-Export Clause was intended to preserve “harmony among
the States” by forbidding “seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry . . . from levying taxes on
citizens of other States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to other States not situated as
favorably geographically.”); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 556
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part); supra note 148.
168 Early legislation sometimes reflected that understanding. See, e.g., Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 527, 528 (imposing a tax on, among other things, “any note or bill of lading for any goods or
merchandise to be exported, if from one district to another district of the United States, not being in the
same state, ten cents; if to be exported to any foreign port or place, twenty-five cents” (emphasis
added)). Congress was seeking to avoid the limitations of the Export Clause by imposing a levy on bills
of lading, rather than the underlying goods, a scheme that should not have worked. See Jensen, Export
Clause, supra note 30, at 21-25.
169 See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 437 (1827) (stating that the term “duty on
imports” in the Import-Export Clause “is a custom or a tax levied on articles brought into a country”).
The reference in the Export Clause is “only to exportation to foreign countries,” United States v.
Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 13 (1915), not to transfers across state lines. Similarly, the term “imports” in the
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William Winslow Crosskey, Justice Thomas has recently explained how the
Import-Export Clause has been misinterpreted in this regard.170 Although
Justice Thomas makes a convincing argument to reclaim original
understanding, this is an issue that is unlikely to be revisited. 171 If Georgia
may not impose a levy on goods going to or coming from South Carolina, it
is because of the negative implications of the Commerce Clause, not
because of the Import-Export Clause.172
Whatever the original understanding of the Import-Export Clause, the
Tonnage Clause can unquestionably apply even if no commerce with
foreign nations is involved.173 For example, in the State Tonnage Tax
Cases,174 decided in 1871, the Supreme Court held that an Alabama levy
was an impermissible duty of tonnage even when imposed on a citizen of
Alabama whose vessel was engaged in commerce only within the ports and
rivers of that state.175 The Tonnage Clause can thus have effect in
circumstances that go beyond those to which the Import-Export Clause has
been held to apply, certainly to preclude duties of tonnage on vessels
engaged in interstate commerce and perhaps even on vessels that are not
engaged in either interstate or foreign commerce. 176 Given the expanded
Import-Export Clause means goods coming from foreign nations, not goods coming from another state.
See Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 131-32 (1868).
170 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 621-22 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing to The True Meaning of the Imports and Exports Clause: Herein of
“Interstate Trade Barriers” in 1787, in 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 295, 295-323 (1953)).
171 See Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, the Import-Export Clause, and Camps
Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 155, 157-58 (1999) (suggesting that before
Justice Thomas’s decision in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, no one suggested a
change back to a reading of “import” and “export” that included interstate commerce as well as international commerce); see also B ORIS I. B ITTKER & BRANNON P. DENNING, B ITTKER ON THE REGULATION
OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN C OMMERCE § 12.02 n.17 (1999) (noting that Justice Thomas’s proposal to
replace Dormant Commerce Clause analysis with the Import-Export Clause could be possible by using
his interpretation of the Import-Export Clause as controlling commerce between the states, but concluding that the proposal would not fix every problem currently addressed by the Import-Export Clause).
172 See ERWIN C HEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.3.4, at 431
(3d ed. 2006) (explaining that the Dormant Commerce Clause is applied when a state or local law
interferes with commerce and that it serves to stop protectionist state legislation that interferes with the
economy).
173 State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 219 (1870) (“[T]he prohibition [of the
Tonnage Clause] extends to all ships and vessels entitled to the privileges of ships and vessels employed
in the coasting trade, whether employed in commercial intercourse between ports in different States or
between different ports in the same State.”); see also State Tax Trends, supra note 128, at 42.
174 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204 (1870).
175 Id. at 216; cf. Peete v. Morgan, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 581, 584 (1873) (“Much more does this
inhibition [of the Tonnage Clause] apply when the vessels are owned by citizens of another State, and
are engaged in commerce between the States, over which Congress has control.”).
176 See Peete, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 584 (noting the result in the State Tonnage Tax Cases even
though the boats “were employed exclusively in the internal commerce of [Alabama], over which
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scope of the Commerce Clause these days, however, that latter point is
probably not of great practical importance. Justice Samuel Freeman Miller
surveyed the state of Tonnage Clause jurisprudence in the late-nineteenth
century and concluded:
[V]essels coming from abroad, or engaged in navigation among the States, or even if plying
entirely within the boundaries of and owned by citizens of a single State, shall not be taxed,
as vessels, for the privilege of navigating the inland waters of the country, or coming into
any of its ports.177

Justice Miller’s comments about the Clause’s scope are as valid now as
when they were written.
2.

The Tonnage Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause

This Article argues that the Tonnage Clause is part of the body of
doctrine giving primacy to the national government in regulating
commerce. But if regulation of commerce is fundamentally federal to begin
with, as the Commerce Clause makes reasonably clear, what is the point of
having a specific restriction on states’ power to levy duties of tonnage—or
on imports or exports, for that matter? After all, James Madison seemed to
think state duties of tonnage would violate the Commerce Clause, and, if
so, a specific restriction on such duties would be redundant.178 Indeed, to a
proponent of national power over commerce, the effect of the ImportExport and Tonnage Clauses is worse than redundancy. The restrictions
might imply that if the Clauses were not part of the Constitution, the states
would have the power to levy import-export taxes or duties of tonnage, and
that, more generally, the states might retain other powers relating to
commerce not specifically prohibited in the Constitution.
In 1824, Chief Justice John Marshall provided an answer to this
conundrum, one that confirms federal power over commerce while
recognizing the existence of state taxing powers. In the great case of
Gibbons v. Ogden,179 the first extended explication of the Dormant
Congress has no control” (emphasis added)). This Article has generally ignored the Indian Commerce
Clause. A hypothetical on point would involve the possible application of the Tonnage Clause to a case
involving “Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes,” U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and doing so would not
add to the arguments in this Article. It is unlikely that the Founders were thinking about Indian tribes
when contemplating the Tonnage Clause, although in principle the Clause could apply to commerce
with the tribes.
177 MILLER, supra note 100, at 253 (emphases added).
178 See Madison, supra note 157, at 625 (“Whether the States are not restrained from laying
tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power ‘to regulate commerce’. [sic] These terms are vague
but seem to exclude this power of the States . . . .”).
179 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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Commerce Clause, 180 the Marshall Court inferred limitations on state power
from the affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress.181 Both
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court and Justice William Johnson’s
concurrence contain significant discussions of the Tonnage Clause, 182 which
once again confirms the importance of the Clause to the Founding
generation.
Among other things, the Justices explained why it should not be
inferred from the Tonnage Clause and other constitutional limitations on
state taxing power that the states retain other regulatory power over
commerce. 183 According to the Court, taxation has a special status in the
constitutional structure, and it was understood that state taxing power,
unlike other forms of regulation affecting commerce, was concurrent with
federal taxing power. 184
Starting with the proposition that “the power over commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government,”185 Justice Marshall
rejected the argument that the power of Congress to regulate foreign and
interstate commerce may “be co-extensive with the subject itself, and have
no other limits than are prescribed in the [C]onstitution, yet the States may
severally exercise the same power, within their respective jurisdictions.” 186
Concurrent state regulation of commerce would interfere with the national
power over commerce.
The Tonnage Clause deals with regulation of commerce, of course, but
it also deals with taxation.187 In contrast to the commerce power generally, it
was always understood that—absent constitutional dictates to the
contrary—the federal government and the states would have concurrent
taxing power.188 Justice Marshall wrote: “The grant of the power to lay and
collect taxes . . . has never been understood to interfere with the exercise of
180

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 172, § 5.3.3.1.
See id.
182 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 202; id. at 236-37 (Johnson, J., concurring).
183 See, e.g., id. at 200-01 (majority opinion) (noting that the Import-Export Clause “shows the
opinion of the Convention, that a State might impose duties on exports and imports, if not expressly
forbidden, will be conceded; but that it follows as a consequence, from this concession, that a State may
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States, cannot be admitted”).
184 Id. at 199 (“The power of taxation is indispensable to their existence, and is a power which . . .
is capable of residing in, and being exercised by, different authorities at the same time. . . . When, then,
each government exercises the power of taxation, neither is exercising the power of the other.”).
185 Id. at 197.
186 Id. at 197-98.
187 See STORY, supra note 141, § 1014 (“The power to lay duties and imposts on imports and
exports, and to lay a tonnage duty, are doubtless properly considered a part of the taxing power; but they
may also be applied, as a regulation of commerce.”).
188 See id. § 1029 (noting that “the power of taxation exists in the states concurrently with the
United States, subject only to the restrictions imposed by the constitution”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 32,
supra note 163, at 195 (Alexander Hamilton).
181
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the same power by the States . . . .”189 States need revenue: “The power of
taxation is indispensable to [the states’] existence, and is a power which, in
its own nature, is capable of residing in, and being exercised by, different
authorities at the same time.”190 Yes, state taxation can affect federal
taxation and vice versa—revenue sources are not infinite, and taxation by
one sovereign can destroy the tax base of the other 191—but in theory, the
existence of a federal taxing power does not eliminate the states’ power to
tax. We know federal and state governments can and do tax the same items,
and “[w]hen . . . each government exercises the power of taxation, neither is
exercising the power of the other.”192
Pure regulation of commerce is different, as the Court explained:
“[W]hen a State proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or
among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to
Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to
do.”193 If that is so, then why the limitations, so clearly related to commerce,
found in the Import-Export and Tonnage Clauses? Justice Marshall had to
concede that the existence of the Import-Export Clause “shows the opinion
of the Convention, that a State might impose duties on exports and imports,
if not expressly forbidden.” 194 But he rejected the extrapolation of that argument—that “any other commercial regulation, not expressly forbidden, to
which the original power of the State was competent, may still be made.”195
The confusion arises because the Taxing Clause and the Commerce
Clause are independent grants of power to Congress. “[T]he act of laying
‘duties or imposts on imports or exports[]’ is considered in the
[C]onstitution as a branch of the taxing power,”196 even though there would
be unquestioned effects on commerce. But because the Taxing Clause could
not be interpreted as limiting state power to tax, the Import-Export Clause
“is an exception from the acknowledged power of the States to levy taxes,
not from the questionable power to regulate commerce.”197 Taxation has
regulatory effects, but it also has its own special constitutional status.
189

Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 198. But see 2 JOHN R ANDOLPH TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION
UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL D ISCUSSION OF ITS GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT, AND
INTERPRETATION § 389, at 844 (Henry St. George Tucker ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1899) (“The
power to lay duties on tonnage is clearly included in the eighth section of the first article . . . . If the
states could lay a duty on tonnage, it would interfere with the power given to Congress . . . .”).
190 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199.
191 One reason the Founders took the direct-tax apportionment rule seriously was that, without
limits on the taxing power, the federal government could dry up states’ revenue. See Jensen, supra note
127, at 2397-2402.
192 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199.
193 Id. at 199-200.
194 Id. at 200.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 201.
197 Id. at 201-02.
OF
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The same analysis explains the limitation on state power to lay duties
of tonnage. Yes, commerce is involved, but taxation is as well:
[A] duty of tonnage being part of the power of imposing taxes, its prohibition may certainly
be made to depend on Congress, without affording any implication respecting a power to
regulate commerce. It is true, that duties may often be, and in fact often are, imposed on
tonnage, with a view to the regulation of commerce; but they may be also imposed with a
view to revenue; and it was, therefore, a prudent precaution, to prohibit the States from
exercising this power.198

Like the Import-Export Clause, the Tonnage Clause is “a prudent
precaution.”199 Maybe these clauses were technically unnecessary, given the
Commerce Clause, but their inclusion removed any doubt. The restrictions
of those clauses “are on the taxing power, not on that to regulate commerce;
and presuppose the existence of that which they restrain, not of that which
they do not purport to restrain.”200
C.

“Duty” of Tonnage

By its terms, the Tonnage Clause forbids only a state’s imposition of
“duties” of tonnage. This Section discusses the terms used in the Constitution to refer to governmental charges, argues that user fees are not taxes or
duties (a relatively noncontroversial position), and urges that, as an absolute
prohibition against the imposition of state duties of tonnage (unless Congress provides otherwise), the Tonnage Clause should apply whether or not
a levy discriminates against vessels (a much more controversial position).
1.

Taxes, Duties, and Other Charges

The Taxing Clause provides that “[t]he Congress shall have Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . .; but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”201 That
passage contains a variety of terms for governmental charges. And the
language could be interpreted to suggest that a “tax” and a “duty” are not
the same thing.
The Founders used varied terminology for governmental exactions in
other constitutional provisions as well: “Tax or Duty” in the Export
Clause202 and in the clause limiting a levy on the “Migration or Importation”
198

Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 202.
Id. (emphasis added).
200 Id. at 202-03.
201 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
202 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
199
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of slaves to “ten dollars for each Person;”203 “Imposts or Duties” in the Import-Export Clause;204 “Tax” or “Taxes” in the Direct-Tax Clauses;205 and,
of course, “Duty” in the Tonnage Clause.
Overlap exists among the terms. Sometimes, it seems, the Founders
used multiple terms out of an excess of caution. For example, would an
“impost,” a levy on imports, not simply be a specialized form of “duty,” in
which case the phrases “Duties, Imposts and Excises” and “Imposts or
Duties” were—in the worst lawyerly style—unnecessarily wordy? Maybe,
but there was no consensus that one term subsumed the other.206 When in
doubt, add words to make sure nothing falls through the cracks.207
An important instance of overlap is found in the Taxing Clause and the
attached Uniformity Clause.208 As argued in a previous article, 209 the phrase
“Duties, Imposts and Excises” referred to the sort of levies generally called
“indirect taxes”—not a constitutional term, but one used in Founding-era
debates.210 The national levies subject to the uniformity rule are generally
required to operate the same way in state A as in state B.211 Other national
taxes (i.e., direct taxes) are subject to the more stringent apportionment
rule, which requires that the levies be apportioned among the states on the
basis of population.212 Among the taxes historically considered to be
direct were capitation taxes (specifically denominated as such in the
203

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. This again suggests that “tax” and “duty” are not synonymous.
205 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
206 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 16, 1787), in 2 FARRAND, supra
note 149, at 304, 305.
207 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. When the language of the general taxing power (i.e.,
“Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1) was discussed at the Convention,
Luther Martin “asked what was meant by the Committee of detail in the expression ‘duties’ and
‘imposts’. [sic] If the meaning were the same, the former was unnecessary; if different, the matter ought
to be made clear.” Madison, supra note 206 (footnote omitted). James Wilson responded, “[D]uties are
applicable to many objects to which the word imposts does not relate. The latter are appropriated to
commerce; the former extend to a variety of objects, as stamp duties &c.” Id.
208 See supra text accompanying note 201.
209 See generally Jensen, supra note 127, at 2382-83, 2386, 2394.
210 See, e.g., James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 12, 1787), in
1 FARRAND, supra note 149, at 591, 592 (emphasis added) (noting Gouverneur Morris’s reassurance, as
reported in Madison’s notes, that “[w]ith regard to indirect taxes on exports & imports & on
consumption, the [direct-tax apportionment] rule would be inapplicable”); THE FEDERALIST N O. 21, at
138 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. Kesler eds., Signet Classic 2003) (1961)
(“Impositions of this kind [imposts, excises, and all duties upon articles of consumption] usually fall
under the denomination of indirect taxes . . . .”).
211 See JENSEN, T AXING POWER, supra note 30, at 76-88.
212 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. The aggregate direct-tax liability for
a state with one-tenth of the national population must be one-tenth of the national total, regardless of
how the tax base is distributed. This rule makes direct taxes politically impossible, except in times of
national emergency. See Jensen, supra note 127, at 2380-89; Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth
Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 CONST. COMMENT. 355, 372-74 (2004).
204
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Constitution)213 and those on real property and, by extension, on personal
property as well. 214
With that understanding, a “duty” is a “tax” of the indirect variety, but
a direct “tax,” including a property tax, is not a “duty.” In another context,
in interpreting the Export Clause’s limitation on federal taxing power, the
Supreme Court has noted that “impost and duty are narrower terms than
tax”215—making the point that the universe of levies prohibited by the
Export Clause is broader than that under the Import-Export Clause.216 If that
is correct, and if this learning transfers to Tonnage Clause analysis, a
property tax levied on a vessel might not be a “duty of tonnage” because it
would not be a duty at all.
When it comes to parsing constitutional provisions that deal with taxation, however, the results in cases outside the Export Clause context have
generally not turned on fine linguistic distinctions. In particular, whether or
not the distinction between “tax” and “duty” was originally intended to
have effect under the Tonnage Clause,217 the case law does not recognize
this distinction. For example, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Gibbons v.
Ogden in 1824: “‘A duty of tonnage’ is as much a tax, as a duty on imports
or exports; and the reason which induced the prohibition of those taxes,
extends to this also.”218 For better or for worse, “tax” and “duty” had long
ago come to be used interchangeably in interpreting the Clause.
Other examples are legion. In the Passenger Cases, decided in 1849,
Justice Grier characterized the Tonnage Clause as forbidding a state from
“levy[ing] a duty or tax . . . graduated on the tonnage or admeasurement of
[a] vessel.”219 In 1873, in Cannon v. New Orleans, Justice Miller referred to

213

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (referring to “Capitation, or other direct, Tax”).
In Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601
(1895), overruled by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, the Supreme Court held that the 1894 income tax was a
direct tax, at least insofar as it reached income from property, that had not been properly apportioned.
Id. at 586. A tax on real estate was unquestionably understood by the Founders to be direct, and in the
first decision, the Pollock Court concluded that there was no substantive difference between a tax on
real estate and one on income from real estate. In the second decision, the Court concluded that income
from personal property should be treated no differently than income from real property for these
purposes. See Jensen, supra note 127, at 2369-70.
215 United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 857 (1996).
216 In United States v. IBM Corp., the Court gave as one reason for its decision that the ImportExport Clause, in limiting state taxing power, cannot be used to interpret the Export Clause and to limit
federal taxing power: the “meaningful textual differences” between the two clauses, including the difference between “Tax or Duty” and “Imposts or Duties.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
217 There appears to be no Founding-era discussion of how a property tax might be treated under
the Tonnage Clause. The silence might have been because no one would have thought such a levy was a
“duty” to begin with or because the Founders’ attentions were elsewhere when the Clause was being
considered.
218 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 202 (1824).
219 Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 458 (1849) (emphasis added).
214
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“a duty or tax or burden imposed under the authority of the State”220—one
term would apparently do as well as another—as being potentially
prohibited by the Clause. In an 1886 case, Morgan’s Steamship Co. v.
Louisiana Board of Health,221 Justice Miller wrote:
In the present case we are of opinion that the fee complained of is not a tonnage tax, that, in
fact, it is not a tax within the true meaning of that word as used in the Constitution, but is a
compensation for a service rendered . . . to the vessel which receives the certificate that
declares it free from further quarantine requirements.” 222

For Miller, the Tonnage Clause guru of the late-nineteenth century, a
“tonnage tax” was the same as a “duty of tonnage.” Nor did any distinction
between tax and duty matter to the Justices in Polar Tankers.223 The
plurality used language like “where a tax otherwise qualifies as a duty of
tonnage.”224 Even the dissenters did not pick up on the distinction, which—
if there were anything to it—would have bolstered their conclusion that the
levy, in the form of a property tax, was not a “duty of tonnage.”
2.

User Fees Versus Taxes (or Duties)

A distinction that did matter in many of the old cases was between
taxes or duties, which might be subject to the Tonnage Clause, and fees for
services, which would not be taxes or duties to begin with and therefore
would be unaffected by the Clause.225 To that common issue, which was not
implicated in Polar Tankers226—this Subsection now turns.
It has been accepted for at least a century and a half that a fee imposed
for services provided by a governmentally operated port, such as for
wharfage or pilotage, is not a prohibited duty of tonnage. 227 In Cooley v.
Board of Wardens,228 one of the cases that developed the modern
understanding of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court noted
220

Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577, 581 (1874) (emphasis added).
118 U.S. 455 (1886).
222 Id. at 463.
223 Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2284, reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31
(2009); see id. at 2287-89 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
224 Id. at 2284 (plurality opinion).
225 See supra note 11.
226 Valdez did not argue that its levy was a valid user fee, and given the way the levy was set up—
applicable only to some vessels and then only to those using private docks (where specific governmental
services were therefore not being provided), measured by value, and so on—such an argument would
have been implausible anyway.
227 The classic treatises from the late-nineteenth century that were quoted earlier took this point for
granted. See, e.g., supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
228 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); see id. at 321 (holding that a requirement that local pilots be
hired to navigate a port was permitted despite the Commerce Clause).
221
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in 1851 that tonnage duties were “known to the commerce of a civilized
world to be as distinct from fees and charges for pilotage . . . as they were
from charges for wharfage or towage, or any other local port-charges for
services rendered to vessels or cargoes.”229 Not every governmental charge
is a tax or duty.
We continue to live in a civilized world, at least when it comes to
distinguishing between duties and user fees. Operating a port is expensive,
and nothing in the Tonnage Clause prevents a state or state subdivision
from charging for the services it renders—if that is what the charge actually
represents. For example, in Packet Co. v. St. Louis,230 a 1879 case, the
Supreme Court looked at whether a municipal corporation could “charg[e]
and collect[] from those using its wharves and facilities, such reasonable
fees as will fairly remunerate it for the use of its property.”231 No
constitutional problem exists, the Court held, so long as a governmental
entity is merely receiving “just compensation.”232
To be sure, the distinction between taxes or duties, on the one hand,
and user fees, on the other, does not jump out from the Founding debates or
the language of the Constitution. But none of the constitutional terms for
governmental charges outlined above works in context if understood to
include charges for services provided by the government.233 How, for
example, can Congress apportion a fee for services among the states on the
basis of population, as it would have to if the fee were a direct “tax”?
Should the Export Clause and the Import-Export Clause really be
interpreted to preclude governmental bodies from charging those who use
ports?234 And if a federal charge is imposed for use of a particular port, what
would it mean to require that the charge be “uniform” throughout the
229

Id. at 314.
100 U.S. 423 (1879).
231 Id. at 427.
232 Id. at 428-29 (discussing Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577 (1874), and Packet
Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1877)).
233 See supra Part III.C.1. The distinction is recognized statutorily. For example, many state
“taxes” are deductible in computing federal taxable income, but fees for benefits are not taxes. See
I.R.C. § 164 (2006). Many foreign taxes are creditable or deductible in computing taxable income, but a
payment to a foreign country for a specific economic benefit is not a tax. See id. §§ 901-03; 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.901-2(a)(2)(i) (2004) (“[A] foreign levy is not pursuant to a foreign country’s authority to levy taxes,
and thus is not a tax, to the extent a person subject to the levy receives (or will receive), directly or
indirectly, a specific economic benefit . . . from the foreign county in exchange for payment pursuant to
the levy.”); Rev. Rul. 61-152, 1961-2 C.B. 42, 43-44 (“A tax is . . . not . . . payment for some special
privilege granted or service rendered.”).
234 The Import-Export Clause includes a passage that creates some interpretational difficulty: it
permits a state to lay imposts or duties without congressional consent if doing so is “absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection Laws.” U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. It has been said that “[t]he
inspection fees which may properly be imposed under this clause are in no sense a duty on imports or
exports, but are a compensation for services.” COOLEY, supra note 18, at 142-43. But if the fees are user
fees, why mention them at all, as they would not have been precluded anyway?
230
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United States? Surely the Constitution cannot require that the same fee be
charged for services provided in every U.S. port, regardless of the value or
cost of the services. One reason the user fee-tax distinction does not appear
in the Founding debates is that the Founders, when discussing taxation,
were not talking about charges for specific benefits.235
The critical question is not whether user fees should be treated
differently than taxes or duties—that point is almost universally conceded
in the case law and commentary236—but what principles should be used to
distinguish fees from taxes.
a.

How to Tell Whether a Charge Is for Services

There are no bright-line rules here or perfect consistency in the case
law. Although hard judgment calls are inevitable, the ultimate question is
whether a quid pro quo exists. If a governmental charge is intended to raise
revenue in a general way, with nothing specifically provided in return (only
the abstract benefits of living in a civilized society), the charge is a tax or
duty. 237 In contrast, if the payor receives something specific in return, and
the amount of the charge is reasonably related to the value of that
something, the charge is a user fee and cannot be a duty of tonnage. 238 That
transaction is no different from any other value-for-value exchange
occurring in a commercial context.239 Of course, a charge should not be
235

See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS . 30, 31, 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
But see Claire R. Kelly & Daniela Amzel, Does the Commerce Clause Eclipse the Export
Clause? Making Sense of United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 84 MINN. L. REV. 129, 145-48
(1999) (arguing that user fees charged by the federal government that are associated with exportation
should be invalid under the Export Clause). For a challenge to the Kelly-Amzel position, see Jensen,
Export Clause, supra note 30, at 44-49.
237 See, e.g., State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 220 (1870) (“Beyond question the
act is an act to raise revenue without any corresponding or equivalent benefit or advantage to the vessels
taxed or to the shipowners . . . .”); cf. Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2284
(“[W]here a tax otherwise qualifies as a duty of tonnage, a general, revenue-raising purpose argues in
favor of, not against, application of the Clause.”), reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31 (2009).
238 See, e.g., Packet Co. v. City of St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423, 427-30 (1879) (“The sums paid . . .
were exacted and paid as compensation for the use of an improved wharf and not for the mere privilege
of entering or stopping at the port . . . .”).
239 An alternative approach, in making the tax-user/fee distinction, might be to focus more on
inputs (i.e., whether the state’s entitlement to money comes from its ownership of a market asset rather
than its exercise of the sovereign taxing power) than on outputs (i.e., whether the funds raised go to
general governmental purposes rather than maintenance of the port). So understood, wharfage is a fee,
not a duty of tonnage, because it can be charged only to boats that choose to use a wharf. Although this
distinction is helpful—a user fee is consensual in an important sense—“choice” can take us only so far.
One of the key distinctions in the minds of the Founders between direct and indirect taxes was that with
an indirect tax on articles of consumption, a person could effectively decide whether to pay the tax by
deciding whether to buy the taxed good. In contrast, with a direct tax like a capitation tax, avoiding the
236
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characterized as a “user fee” for these purposes just because the state labels
the charge as such. If a state were to impose a charge for use of its ports,
but the charge had little or nothing to do with services provided by the state,
it should not be characterized as a user fee.
In some historic cases, the characterization of a charge as a duty was
relatively easy because it was clear that the government operating the port
provided nothing in the way of services.240 In Polar Tankers itself, for that
matter, Valdez did not even try to argue that the levy was a user fee. 241
Much earlier, in Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, decided in 1867, the
Supreme Court concluded that a fixed charge imposed on any ship entering
the port of New Orleans was a duty of tonnage, not a user fee, because the
statute specifically provided that the charge was required “whether [the
master and wardens] be called on to perform any service or not.”242
Reasonable people can sometimes differ as to whether a government
might be required to provide services. In the 1874 Cannon v. New Orleans
decision, for example, the Supreme Court rejected the city’s argument that
the charge at issue was a wharfage fee because the charge by its terms
would have applied whether or not a vessel tied up to any wharf within the
port:
A tax which is, by its terms, due from all vessels arriving and stopping in a port, without
regard to the place where they may stop, whether it be in the channel of the stream, or out in
a bay, or landed at a natural river-bank, cannot be treated as a compensation for the use of a
wharf.243

As an abstract matter, that may be true, but the Cannon Court read the
statute in an otherworldly way. By its terms, the statute might technically
have applied to a ship stopped “in the channel of the stream” or “landed at a
natural river-bank,”244 where the port of New Orleans would obviously have
provided no specific services, but it seems unlikely that the port intended to
make any effort to collect charges in those circumstances. If one takes that
levy was difficult, if not impossible. See Jensen, supra note 127, at 2393-97. Like user fees, “duties” are
avoidable in this sense, but they are nevertheless “taxes,” at least for some purposes.
240 See, e.g., City of Oakland v. E. K. Wood Lumber Co., 292 P. 1076, 1080 (Cal. 1930)
(per curiam) (holding that an “ordinance requiring every vessel to land at the city’s wharves, or, upon
paying the same charge, be entitled to a permit to land at some other wharf in the city, is not a charge, as
to vessels so landing elsewhere, for facilities or services furnished by the city” and thus was an
unconstitutional duty of tonnage).
241 The ordinance, by its terms, characterized the levy as a personal property tax, with no tie to
services, and it is difficult for a government to seriously argue that its charge is other than as labeled.
See Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2283-85. But see infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text (describing
the federal government’s posture in an Export Clause case and arguing that the Harbor Maintenance Tax
was a user fee).
242 S.S. Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 34 (1867) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243 Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577, 580 (1874).
244 Id.
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possibility seriously, however, as the Cannon Court did, the duty-oftonnage result was easy.
Even if it is clear that a state government might be called on to provide
some services, a question might remain about how close the relationship
must be between the “fee” charged and the value of the services if the
charge is to be treated as a user fee. On this point, we can transfer learning
from Export Clause jurisprudence to the Tonnage Clause context. Although
the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that the Export Clause is
unique and that, in general, the principles of other clauses should not be
used to interpret it (and vice versa),245 there is no obvious reason why that
should be so—at least not on this issue. A fee for services is a fee for
services, regardless of the constitutional provision involved. And it has
been understood, at least since 1876, that if the federal government imposes
a user fee affecting taxpayers engaged in exportation, the fee is not a “Tax
or Duty . . . on Articles exported from any State”246 and is therefore not
prohibited by the Export Clause.247 If a user fee is not a “tax or duty” under
the Export Clause, a similar fee imposed by a state on vessels ought not to
be a “duty of tonnage.”
The user-fee issue came up most recently in 1998 in United States v.
United States Shoe Corp.,248 where the Court considered whether the federal
Harbor Maintenance Tax (“HMT”), as it applied to exports, was an invalid
tax or duty on exported articles. 249 The HMT was an excise imposed “on
any port use . . . [in] an amount equal to 0.125 percent of the value of the
commercial cargo involved.”250 The statute defined “commercial cargo” as
“any cargo transported on a commercial vessel,” including exported
goods251—hence the Export Clause question.
In U.S. Shoe, the government found itself in the awkward position of
having to argue that the Harbor Maintenance Tax was not a “tax or duty.” 252
The government appeared to argue that it was a fee for use of ports: a

245

See United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 368 (1998) (“[T]he Export Clause’s
simple, direct, unqualified prohibition on any taxes or duties distinguishes it from other constitutional
limitations on governmental taxing authority.”).
246 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
247 See Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 375 (1875) (holding that a stamp on exported tobacco was a
user fee not prohibited by the Export Clause because the charge “bore no proportion whatever to the
quantity or value of the package on which [the stamp] was affixed”); see also U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 369
(citing Pace with approval).
248 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
249 Id. at 363.
250 I.R.C. § 4461(a)-(b) (1990), invalidated by U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. 360. “[P]ort use” meant
“(A) the loading of commercial cargo on, or (B) the unloading of commercial cargo from, a commercial
vessel at a port.” Id. § 4462(a)(1).
251 Id. § 4462(a)(3)(A) (internal quotation marks omitted).
252 U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 367-68.
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“charge designed as compensation for Government-supplied services,
facilities, or benefits.”253
To be a fee, said the Court, the HMT had to “fairly match the
exporters’ use of port services and facilities.”254 Determining a “fair match”
requires judgment, of course, and the process lends itself to a good amount
of wiggle room. The benefits provided by governments are often of a sort
not readily available in the marketplace, making a determination of a “fair
match” problematic. Ultimately, and inevitably, characterization requires a
facts-and-circumstances analysis, and resolution of the issue should depend
on whether there is correlation between charge and value of services, not
on whether absolute equivalence (whatever that might mean) exists.255
Deference will be given to legislative characterizations of charges; in
1876, the Court said it had to show “due regard to that latitude of discretion
which the legislature is entitled to exercise in the selection of the means for
attaining a constitutional object.”256 But, as noted earlier, in U.S. Shoe,
Congress’s characterization of the HMT was not helpful to the
government’s case.257 The HMT failed constitutionally because the measure
of the charge was “not a fair approximation of services, facilities, or
benefits furnished to the exporters.”258 If a harbor usage fee is going to be
measured by value, it should be measured by the benefit provided and not
the goods being shipped.
The same sort of analysis ought to be appropriate under the Tonnage
Clause: Is the charge “a fair approximation of services, facilities, or benefits
furnished?” If so, it is ipso facto a user fee and not a duty of tonnage.
b.

Fees Measured by Tonnage

If a charge imposed on a vessel is measured by tonnage, as the term
was traditionally understood, that fact is not helpful to a state government
arguing for the legitimacy of the charge. But neither is tying a charge to
253 Id. at 363. The proceeds were deposited in a fund from which Congress would appropriate
amounts for harbor maintenance and development projects. See I.R.C. § 9505(a).
254 U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 370.
255 See id. at 369 (“Pace establishes that . . . the connection between a service the Government
renders and the compensation it receives for that service must be closer than is present here. Unlike the
stamp charge in Pace, the HMT is determined entirely on an ad valorem basis. The value of export
cargo, however, does not correlate reliably with the federal harbor services used or usable by the
exporter.”).
256 Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 375-76 (1875) (stating that “[t]he rule by which [the amounts] are
estimated may be an arbitrary one; but an arbitrary rule may be more convenient and less onerous than
any other which can be adopted” and then noting the inevitable “latitude of discretion which the
legislature is entitled”).
257 See supra text accompanying note 252.
258 U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 363.
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tonnage necessarily fatal. Long ago, Justice Cooley made that point in one
of his treatises: “Wharfage dues are not taxes, and they may, therefore, be
laid in proportion to tonnage.”259 In Packet Co. v. Keokuk,260 for example,
decided in 1877, the Court stated that nothing in the previous case law
“justifies the assertion that either wharfage or port charges are duties of
tonnage, merely because they are proportioned to the actual tonnage or
cubical capacity of vessels.”261
As counterintuitive as this might initially seem, it is consistent with the
distinction between fees and taxes. If the charge is sufficiently related to the
value of services provided, it is a user fee and not a duty. And the value of
services provided in a particular situation might very well correlate with the
size of vessels involved: larger vessels require more services.
c.

Nature of the Services

Another question that can arise is how specific to a particular vessel
services provided by a port must be for a charge to be treated as a legitimate
user fee. In its most recent, pre-Polar Tankers decision under the Tonnage
Clause, Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Commission,
the Supreme Court concluded that a charge on all vessels using the Port of
Mobile was not a prohibited duty of tonnage. The amount of the charge
depended on tonnage, 262 but, as already noted, that did not rule out user-fee
status. And the state successfully argued that the charge was a fee for
policing the harbor to ensure vessel safety. 263
Although taxpayer Clyde Mallory Lines had made no specific request
for services, the Court agreed with the state that tonnage was a reasonable
measure of the value of safety services received by any user of the port.264
The value of protective services for a large vessel is higher, in general, than
the value of services in protecting a small one.
That result is not bizarre, but it is peculiar to treat policing as the sort
of governmental service that a user fee might cover. Providing for public
safety, on land or at sea, was traditionally thought to be a function of

259

COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 19; see supra text accompanying note 19.
95 U.S. 80 (1877).
261 Id. at 87; see also Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559, 562 (1881) (“[I]t is no objection to
the ordinance fixing the amount of [a purported wharfage fee] that it was measured by the size of the
vessel, and that this size was ascertained by the tonnage of each vessel.”).
262 Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 263 (1935). Clyde
Mallory Lines had vessels of “500 tons and over,” subject to a fee of $7.50. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
263 See id. at 266-67.
264 Id. at 267.
260
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government,265 with no direct linkage between amounts paid and value of
benefit received. We generally pay for the benefits of civilized society, that
is, with taxes, not fees. The Court in Clyde Mallory Lines held otherwise on
this point, however: “It is not any the less a service beneficial to appellant
because its vessels have not been given any special assistance.”266
d.

Deference to State Characterization

In addition to what it says about measuring fees by tonnage and
treating safety services as no different from wharfage or pilotage, Clyde
Mallory Lines illustrates a judicial reluctance to question governmental
characterizations of particular charges. 267 Deference is not complete, of
course, but for legislators to cross the line, they must take giant steps.
The most striking example of judicial deference in the Tonnage Clause
context was Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg,268 decided in 1882, where
the Supreme Court refused to look beyond the language of a municipal
ordinance. 269 The ordinance characterized a charge imposed on vessels
using city docks as a wharfage fee, with the measure of the charge
determined by the tonnage of the vessel, and the Court, over one dissent,
looked no further.270
Indeed, the Court determined that it had no jurisdiction to undertake a
more detailed inquiry of a local matter.271 The Court had concluded in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens that a local requirement that pilots be hired to
navigate a port was consistent with the Dormant Commerce Clause. 272 The
rule affected interstate and foreign commerce, to be sure, but only at the
margins. Wharves, said the Transportation Co. Court, are similarly local in
nature, and federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear such disputes.273

265 See, e.g., COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 19, at 227 (describing the police power as
“a most comprehensive branch of sovereignty”).
266 Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 266.
267 See id. at 267 (“State regulations of harbor traffic, although they incidentally affect commerce,
interstate or foreign, are of local concern. So long as they do not impede the free flow of commerce and
are not made the subject of regulation by Congress they are not forbidden.”). Just as courts are hesitant
to second guess Congress on Export Clause matters, see supra text accompanying note 256, they are
inclined to defer to state legislatures trying to avoid the strictures of the Import-Export and Tonnage
Clauses.
268 107 U.S. 691 (1883).
269 Id. at 707 (“It cannot be supposed that the law authorizes exorbitant [wharfage rates] to be
made; but whether the charges exacted are exorbitant or not can only be determined by that law.”).
270 Id. at 706-07.
271 Id. at 707 (“[T]he question of reasonableness of wharfage . . . is only determinable by the laws
of the State within whose jurisdiction the wharf is situated.”).
272 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 321 (1851).
273 Transp. Co., 107 U.S. at 707.
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Conceptions of the scope of the Commerce Clause have changed so
dramatically since 1882 that the jurisdictional issue in Transportation Co.
would not be resolved in the same way today. But the reluctance of judges
to question legislative characterizations remains as powerful now as it was
then.
3.

Discrimination and Duties of Tonnage

Perhaps the most debated issue under the Tonnage Clause—it certainly
was contentious in Polar Tankers—is the question of discrimination. Is a
duty of tonnage a levy that targets vessels, or is it possible that even a
widely applicable personal property tax might run afoul of the Tonnage
Clause insofar as it applies to vessels? This Article’s answer is that a levy
can violate the Tonnage Clause, as written and originally understood,
without being discriminatory, but discrimination now seems to be widely
accepted as a necessary element of a Tonnage Clause claim.
One practical, preliminary point worth making is that, whatever the
ultimate answer to the legal question, a state levy that singles out vessels for
taxation is more likely to face a Tonnage Clause challenge. Had Valdez
openly and notoriously imposed a more generally applicable personal
property tax, the likelihood of a tanker company’s challenge would have
been lessened. Instead, the Valdez ordinance by its terms applied only to
boats and vessels, and then only to those of a particular length.274 The
Valdez officials might just as well have labeled the ordinance “A Levy to
Elicit Challenges Under the Tonnage Clause.”
In Polar Tankers, the tanker company had argued that “[t]his
anti-discrimination principle, which also applies under the Import-Export
Clause, is an essential element of Tonnage Clause doctrine.”275 That
statement accurately describes the understanding of the Tonnage Clause
reflected in a multitude of Supreme Court cases and in treatises from the
days when the Clause was a hot-button issue.276 For example, W. H.
Burroughs wrote in 1877 that “[t]he prohibition only comes into play where
[vessels] are not taxed in the same manner as other property of citizens of
the State, but where the tax is imposed upon the vessel, the instrument of
commerce, without reference to the value of the vessel.”277 Burroughs’s
statement, with one word (inadvertently?) changed—the “but” became an
274

See supra note 32.
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 12, at 10 (advocating the view that the Founders deliberately
included the Tonnage Clause to prevent states with access to seaways from using onerous fees to take
advantage of their landlocked neighbors).
276 It may not accurately reflect Import-Export Clause doctrine, however. See infra notes 295-97
and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court has not explicitly held that discrimination is
necessary for an Import-Export Clause claim).
277 BURROUGHS , supra note 95, at 91.
275
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“or,” making the Tonnage Clause more likely to apply—was blessed by the
Supreme Court the next year in Transportation Co. v. Wheeling.
With that authority on the books—that is, requiring an investigation as
to whether a levy reaches vessels “in the same manner” as other property—
it made sense tactically for Polar Tankers to take the position it did. It
would have been foolhardy for the company to argue that any property tax
reaching vessels with a tax situs in a port is invalid under the Tonnage
Clause. That theory was unlikely to attract a majority of the Justices,278 and,
besides, the argument that the Valdez ordinance discriminated against
vessels was a strong one. 279 Polar Tankers wanted to win its case, not to
push a broader theory that was unnecessary for the Court to rule in the
company’s favor.
The plurality in Polar Tankers took as its starting point the position
that the Tonnage Clause cannot be interpreted to prohibit all state property
taxes on ships—just discriminatory ones—because otherwise, vessels
would be treated better than other forms of property.280 But because the
Valdez levy did single out large vessels, it was not imposed on vessels “in
the same manner” as on other property. Indeed, with the ordinance
interpreted in isolation, without regard to other ordinances or state
statutes,281 there was no “other property” being taxed at all. Justice Breyer
wrote for the plurality that “[w]e can find little, if any, other personal
property that [Valdez] taxes.”282
A levy that was so apparently discriminatory (and that could not have
been seen as a user fee) was problematic, and Justice Alito was correct that
278 With the benefit of hindsight, we know that two Justices (i.e., Roberts and Thomas) would have
been receptive to such an argument. See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2288
(Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Tonnage Clause applies to ‘any
Duty of Tonnage,’ regardless of how that duty compares to other commercial taxes.” (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3)), reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31 (2009). Justice Alito could likely have been
convinced as well. See id. at 2289 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if the Tonnage Clause permits a true,
evenhanded property tax to be applied to vessels, the Valdez tax is an unconstitutional duty of
tonnage.”).
279 Justice Alito’s concurrence pointed out that if the Valdez levy was discriminatory, the Court
had no need to consider the status of a nondiscriminatory levy. Id. at 2289 (Alito, J., concurring); see
also supra text accompanying note 62.
280 Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2285.
281 See supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
282 Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2285. Had the “in the same manner” test, so understood, been
satisfied, the plurality would presumably have approved the levy. See id. (pointing out numerous
exceptions in Valdez’s property taxation scheme, which placed the burden almost entirely on ships).
Concurring Justice Alito said that it was unnecessary to provide any inference about the
nondiscriminatory situation because the Valdez levy so clearly did single out vessels. Id. at 2289
(Alito, J., concurring). But the Burroughs passage blessed in Transportation Co.—argued the Polar
Tankers dissenters—requires only that a property tax be measured by value, whether or not other types
of personal property are reached. With that understanding, the Valdez levy would have survived
scrutiny. See id. at 2291-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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it was unnecessary for the Court to infer any broader principles. 283
Nevertheless, the question remains whether discrimination is in fact an
“essential element” for a levy that is in the form of a personal property tax
to be rejected under the Tonnage Clause. The Clause “says nothing about
discrimination,”284 as Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas
emphasized, “and it should hardly come as a surprise that a constitutional
ban on tonnage duties would give preferential treatment to vessels.”285 In
their view, the states were not supposed to be taxing these instruments of
commerce at all, without congressional permission: “Such protection
reflects the high value the Framers placed on the free flow of maritime
commerce.”286
The understanding of the role of discrimination in Export Clause
jurisprudence might help us understand how the Tonnage Clause should be
interpreted. A previous article on the Export Clause argued that the ImportExport Clause, which applies to the states and has been interpreted
permissively—as prohibiting only levies on imports or exports that discriminate against those goods287—and the Export Clause, which the Supreme
Court in the 1990s described as an absolute prohibition on such taxes, ought
to be interpreted consistently. 288 This had been the case historically. Indeed,
Chief Justice John Marshall took this position, writing in 1827 that the two
clauses should have a common core: “There is some diversity in language,
but none is perceivable in the act which is prohibited.”289
Nevertheless, in the two Export Clause cases decided in the 1990s, the
Supreme Court concluded that the jurisprudence of the Import-Export
Clause was not helpful in interpreting the Export Clause (and, presumably,
vice versa).290 The Import-Export Clause contains nothing like the clear
“textual command”291 of the Export Clause, said the Court, and it therefore
discarded the long-time understanding that the two clauses should be read
as a package, with mutually reinforcing goals. 292 “IBM[, the first of the two
283

See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2288 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 The Supreme Court has not explicitly said this, see infra notes 295-97 and accompanying text,
but it is often assumed to be the case. See, e.g., Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2283 (plurality opinion).
288 See Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 30, at 71.
289 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445 (1827).
290 See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 857, 859 (1996) (acknowledging that there
are key textual differences between the two clauses that render them incompatible with each other, as
well as noting that the two clauses serve opposite goals).
291 See id. at 851 (“Our decades-long struggle over the meaning of the nontextual negative
command of the dormant Commerce Clause does not lead to the conclusion that our interpretation of the
textual command of the Export Clause is equally fluid.”).
292 Id. at 852-53.
284
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Export Clause cases,] plainly stated,” wrote Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
U.S. Shoe, the second case, “that the Export Clause’s simple, direct,
unqualified prohibition on any taxes or duties distinguishes it from other
constitutional limitations on governmental taxing authority.”293 The 1990s
Court thought it knew better than Chief Justice Marshall about the
relationship between the Export Clause, where discrimination is irrelevant,
and the Import-Export Clause.294
Not all of the Justices were convinced that the Import-Export Clause
was directed only at discriminatory taxation. In IBM, Justice Thomas wrote
for a majority of seven and suggested that Import-Export Clause
jurisprudence might indeed preclude a state-imposed, “nondiscriminatory
tax directly on goods in import or export transit”295—or at least that the
government had not convinced them otherwise—just as the Export Clause
altogether precludes a tax on articles exported.296 And Justice Thomas
emphasized that regardless of the conventional wisdom, “this Court’s
Import-Export Clause cases have not upheld the validity of generally
applicable, nondiscriminatory taxes that fall on imports or exports in
transit.”297 The assumption nevertheless remains that discrimination is
required for a state levy to be struck down under the Import-Export Clause,
while the Court has explicitly held that no such requirement should be
imported (so to speak) into Export Clause analysis.
Neither the language, the purposes, nor the original understanding of
the Import-Export Clause, however, suggests that it should have been
interpreted in a way fundamentally different from the Export Clause. This
Article’s argument is not that the “absolute prohibition” that the Court saw
in the Export Clause was wrong; it is that Import-Export Clause
jurisprudence had gone off-track because the Court had not seen a similarly
absolute prohibition in that Clause. And the Tonnage Clause is no less
absolute in its commands than the Import-Export Clause.
The Import-Export Clause is permissive, in a way, in that Congress
can authorize a state to levy a tax on imports or exports.298 If that does not
happen, however, and assuming the contemplated levies go beyond what is

293

United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 368 (1998).
See IBM Corp., 517 U.S. at 857 (“We have good reason to hesitate before adopting the analysis
of our recent Import-Export Clause cases into our Export Clause jurisprudence. . . . [M]eaningful textual
differences exist [between the two clauses] and should not be overlooked.”).
295 Id. at 861-62.
296 Id. at 863 (“We conclude that the Export Clause does not permit assessment of nondiscriminatory federal taxes on goods in export transit.”).
297 Id. at 862.
298 By contrast, the Export Clause is a limitation on Congress, and Congress cannot waive such a
limitation. E.g., id. at 861 (“[T]he Framers sought to alleviate their concerns by completely denying to
Congress the power to tax exports at all.”).
294
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“absolutely necessary for executing [the state’s] inspection Laws,”299 the
language of the Import-Export Clause is no less absolute than that of the
Export Clause. The term “tax or duty” must be broader than “duty”—it
certainly is not narrower—so that the prohibition under the Export Clause is
broader than that under the Import-Export Clause, as the Court noted in
IBM and U.S. Shoe.300 But both clauses ultimately command: Do not impose
the prohibited levies! “The Export Clause forbids a national ‘tax or duty’ on
‘articles exported’; the Import-Export Clause generally forbids state ‘duties’
on ‘exports’ without congressional consent.”301 Neither Clause hints that
discrimination is relevant.
The divergence in Import-Export Clause and Export Clause
jurisprudence—how by the 1990s discrimination was seen as relevant, and
maybe critical, to Import-Export Clause analysis but not under the Export
Clause—was due to historical accident, not reasoned analysis. 302 And, if the
Import-Export Clause and the Tonnage Clause are directed at the same
goal—ensuring the primacy of the national government in regulating
commerce—then the Tonnage Clause, also an absolute prohibition on state
duties of tonnage without congressional permission, ought to be interpreted
in a similarly robust way. Doing so would have the additional salutary
effect of eliminating the inevitable issue about how pervasive a personal
property tax that reaches vessels must be so as not to be considered
discriminatory. 303
Discrimination’s irrelevance is fairly clear, but, notwithstanding the
seemingly absolute language of the Tonnage Clause, and of the ImportExport Clause as well, it remains the case that discrimination is likely to
remain an “essential element” of any claim under those clauses. The
Supreme Court has not stated this explicitly about the Import-Export
Clause, and in Polar Tankers, only a plurality said discrimination is an

299

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. This language in the Import-Export Clause seems to simply
recognize the legitimacy of user fees of a particular sort. See supra note 234.
300 United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 368-69 (1998); IBM Corp., 517 U.S. at 857-59.
301 Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 30, at 68 (quoting U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2).
302 See id. at 70-71. According to this theory, the twentieth-century Court decided taxation cases
exclusively under the Import-Export clause, ignoring the Export Clause for decades after 1923. Id. at 17
& n.73. During that time, the Court interpreted the Clause ever more permissively. See, e.g., IBM Corp.,
517 U.S. at 859. The scope of the Import-Export Clause evolved as the Court analyzed it, while Export
Clause jurisprudence stagnated as the Court ignored it. See Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 30, at 70.
Only when the Court revisited the Export Clause in 1996 in IBM did it discover this divergence, and to
avoid rendering the Export Clause obsolete, the Court was forced to sever the connection between the
two Clauses. See IBM Corp., 517 U.S. at 853.
303 See Taylor Simpson-Wood, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, Alaska: A New Spin on the
Tonnage Clause Leaves Lower Courts and Government Taxing Authorities High and Dry, 33 HAMLINE
L. REV. 19, 37 (2010) (“After Polar Tankers, both lower courts and taxing authorities are left to wonder
just how much additional property must be taxed so that vessels may also be taxed with impunity.”).
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essential element of a Tonnage Clause claim. But the plurality had inertia
on its side, and inertia has legal effect. 304
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS: POLAR TANKERS, STATUTORY DRAFTING, AND THE
TONNAGE CLAUSE
Polar Tankers was rightly decided. The City of Valdez levied the tax
because of the use of a port; the measure of the tax was close to the original
conception of tonnage (although that was probably not necessary for the
Tonnage Clause to apply); the levy was not even arguably a user fee (and,
indeed, Valdez did not try to argue that it was); and the levy applied (or so
it was assumed) only to vessels using Valdez’s ports. Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Thomas were correct that the holding could have gone further:
the levy could have been struck down even if it had not been deemed
discriminatory. Nevertheless, if a tax that is in the form of a property tax
does discriminate against vessels, it is a fortiori an invalid duty of tonnage.
A few loose ends relating to Polar Tankers remain. This final Part
discusses whether Valdez’s problem was simply attributable to bad drafting
and whether the city could have gotten the desired results with an
economically equivalent levy that would not have implicated the Tonnage
Clause. It then examines whether any great purpose is still served by
enforcing the Tonnage Clause in general, or in a particular situation like
that in Polar Tankers.
A.

Drafting and the Tonnage Clause

On the drafting question, the answer is clear: if Valdez’s goal was to
impose a levy on oil tankers, and basically only on oil tankers, doing so was
impossible given the Tonnage Clause. Yes, the Valdez government could
have crafted a levy that reached oil tankers “in the same manner” as it
reached a significant body of other personal property—interpreting “in the
same manner” the way the Polar Tankers plurality did—and thus could
have satisfied at least six of the nine Justices. But enacting such a levy
would have fundamentally changed the tax base at which the levy was
aimed.
The city’s goal was to tax oil tankers, not to tax personal property
more generally. Valdez’s unquestionably discriminatory goal, reflected in
the language of the ordinance, was one reason a clear constitutional
problem existed. Drafting a more broadly applicable personal property levy
304

Cf. supra text accompanying notes 168-72 (suggesting that the Supreme Court as a whole is
unlikely to revisit the view—which is perhaps inconsistent with the original understanding—that the
Import-Export Clause applies only to foreign commerce).
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would have required a significant, substantive change in the law—with the
attendant political pushback that would have resulted from others facing an
increased tax bill—not merely a change in the language of the ordinance.
B.

The Purposes of the Tonnage Clause and Polar Tankers

This Article began by noting the common view—common, that is,
among the three people who think about the Tonnage Clause—that
constitutional provisions like the Clause are historical artifacts. Even if the
Clause was considered important in 1789, the argument might go, we have
moved so far beyond the circumstances of that time that we could ignore
the Clause, and the Republic would survive.
The Republic would survive—indeed, it would survive the repeal or
the decline into desuetude of many constitutional provisions—but that is
not the standard we ordinarily apply in constitutional interpretation. The
Tonnage Clause issues were hard to avoid in Polar Tankers,305 and the case
was close to a sure thing, at least in the minds of most Supreme Court
Justices. We could countenance such a levy only if we were to ignore an
explicit constitutional limitation on state power, and we might have to
ignore the purposes of the Clause as well. As the plurality wrote, Valdez’s
levy, “no less than a similar duty, may . . . ‘ta[x] the consumption’ of those
in other states. It is consequently the kind of tax that the Tonnage Clause
forbids.”306
But—a critic of Polar Tankers might say—it really was not clear that
the purposes of the Tonnage Clause were served by invalidating the Valdez
levy. For one thing, it was not at all evident that the levy “taxed the
consumption” of consumers elsewhere. How could the costs of the levy
have been passed on, dollar for dollar, given the worldwide petroleum
market? It is not as though ConocoPhillips, the parent of Polar Tankers,
could have charged consumers in other states more for Alaskan oil than it
could have charged for similar oil that did not pass through Valdez. If the
price at the pump were higher for gasoline refined from Alaskan oil,
who would buy it?
More generally, the extent to which taxes imposed on businesses can
be passed on to consumers depends on market forces. If provisions like the
Tonnage Clause were based on mistaken assumptions about the economic

305 Once the Court agreed to hear the case, the Tonnage Clause could have been avoided only if the
Court had struck down the levy on the Due Process-Commerce Clause claim made by Polar Tankers.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
306 Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (citation omitted) (quoting Letter
from James Madison to Professor Davis, supra note 150), reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 31 (2009).
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incidence of taxation,307 perhaps we should curtail our enthusiasm for
enforcing those provisions. Maybe we should not apply the Tonnage Clause
in cases with real doubt as to whether the “consumption of those in other
states” is being taxed.
Still another reason modern theorists might question the application of
the Tonnage Clause to a levy like Valdez’s is that the Founders’ concern
that state taxation would create frictions and harm national unity seems farfetched these days.308 It is hard to imagine anyone, except those directly
affected, getting worked up about duties imposed on ships. Other than oil
executives, who outside Valdez knew, or cared, about the ordinance?
Anyway, the market protects against abusive taxation, as Justice Story
noted long ago. 309 States fighting for business are unlikely to impose duties
of tonnage because doing so could drive business to competing ports in
other states. So why worry about the Tonnage Clause?
Finally, the dissenters in Polar Tankers raised another point: even if
the burden of the Valdez levy could be passed on to consumers in other
jurisdictions—unlikely in full, but there could be effects at the margins—
how does a duty of tonnage differ economically from any other levy that
Alaska (or Valdez) might have imposed on oil operations?
Taxes imposed on ships exporting . . . oil have the same effect on commerce in oil as do
taxes on oil-production property or the oil itself, and Alaska’s authority to impose taxes on
oil and oil-production property is undisputed. From an economic or political point of view,
there is no difference between Alaska’s geographical control over the area in which the oil is
produced and the port from which it is exported.310

Is there any longer a reason to treat state taxes on vessels, and state taxes on
imports and exports, any differently, as a matter of constitutional law, than
other state levies on business operations?
There are several responses to these criticisms. To begin with, it is true
that our increased economic sophistication should cause us to view
Tonnage Clause claims skeptically. But skepticism is not justification for
ignoring a specific provision of the Constitution, one that is part of the
structure intended to ensure federal control over commerce. That goal is
important, and the Valdez levy seemed so clearly to violate the Tonnage
Clause that a different result would have written the Clause out of the
Constitution. Whether one likes the Tonnage Clause or not, it remains. And
it is worth remembering that if Valdez’s goals were defensible ones, the
city had a way to get what it wanted: ask Congress for permission to impose
307 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the Founders’ assumptions about the
incidence of indirect taxes).
308 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
309 See STORY, supra note 141, § 1019.
310 Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2294 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the levy. It has been a long time since such a request has been entertained, 311
but it has happened and it could happen again.
If there were no Tonnage Clause, it is true that market forces would
still prevent many seaboard states from imposing tonnage duties. For those
states, the Tonnage Clause might be irrelevant, but it would also do them no
harm. 312 The situation in Valdez was different, however. Given that Valdez
is the terminus of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, tanker companies could not,
all of a sudden, have shopped around to find a friendlier port in the way that
ships carrying cotton could. The Valdez levy might not have been a clear
tax on the “consumption” of those in other states, but it was certainly
intended to pull largely captive, out-of-state enterprises into the Valdez tax
system. That factor should be taken into account in Tonnage Clause
jurisprudence. 313
Finally, the point made by the dissenters in Polar Tankers is a peculiar
one. It may be that—economically and politically—a tax on oil tankers is
no different from a tax on oil-production property, and everyone can agree
that the Tonnage Clause would not forbid a tax of that latter sort. But the
Tonnage Clause does what it does. It treats taxes on means of transport
differently from taxes on other items. And the Import-Export Clause also
serves its particular purpose. Maybe if the Founders had been better able to
see the economic future, they would have concluded that other forms of
state taxation affecting commerce should have been forbidden as well. That
they did not do so hardly supports ignoring the limitations included in the
Constitution.
Sometimes problems of this sort—an apparent incongruity between
goals and actual provisions—can be taken care of by imaginative
interpretation. Nineteenth-century jurists had no difficulty in extending the
meaning of “duty of tonnage” to apply to levies generally on vessels, even
if not directly on tonnage. Indeed, if they had not done that, the Tonnage
Clause would have been gutted. 314 And we can reasonably interpret the
Clause today, if necessary, to apply to duties on means of transport, like
aircraft, unknown in 1789.315
But trying to eliminate the incongruity noted by the dissenters by
extending the Tonnage Clause’s prohibition to taxes on commerce
generally would stretch the language beyond recognition. Of course, that is
not what the dissenters were arguing for, but it is no more persuasive to
311
312

See supra note 17.
A state is not damaged by a clause that forbids it from doing something it would not do

anyway.
313 This point is not one that would have been apparent to the Founders because it was assumed
then, and for decades thereafter, that a state could not tax a vessel the home port of which was
elsewhere. See supra note 46.
314 See supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
315 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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conclude that the Clause should be inapplicable to duties that it was
intended to reach. We should not ignore a constitutional restriction because
it is narrower than it might otherwise have been.
If it is incongruous to treat duties on vessels differently than taxes
on other commercial activities, so be it. Life is incoherent; not all
constitutional anomalies can be eliminated through interpretation. And
focusing on incongruities should not cause us to overlook the core of good
sense in the Tonnage Clause and other provisions dealing with federal
control over commerce.
CONCLUSION
The Tonnage Clause is not the most important provision in the
Constitution, but it is full of wonderful interpretive issues, enriched by
history. And it deals with a nontrivial matter: federal regulation of
commerce. For purely intellectual reasons, the Clause does not deserve to
be ignored. And, as Polar Tankers shows, quirky though the Clause may
be, it deals with matters in which real dollars can be at stake. It is a small
clause, but there are those who love it.

